Thomas Friedman makes some good points in Oasis or Mirage? He notes that the players in Annapolis were motivated more by fear than by love. Unlike others, he attaches a lot significance to the missing handshake.
The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, announced even before he got to Annapolis that there would be no handshakes with any Israelis. Too bad. A handshake alone is not going to get Israel to give back the West Bank. But a surprising gesture of humanity, like a simple handshake from a Saudi leader to an Israeli leader, would actually go a long way toward convincing Israelis that there is something new here, that it’s not just about the Arabs being afraid of Iran, but that they’re actually willing to coexist with Israel. Ditto Israel. Why not surprise Palestinians with a generous gesture on prisoners or roadblocks? Has the stingy old way worked so well?The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been so starved of emotional content since the Rabin assassination that it has no connection to average people anymore. It’s just words — a bunch of gobbledygook about “road maps.†The Saudis are experts at telling America that it has to be more serious. Is it too much to ask the Saudis to make our job a little easier by shaking an Israeli leader’s hand?
The bottom line is that if Prince Saud al-Faisal had, say, refused to greet Secretary Rice because of her gender or her skin color he would have been (rightly) excoriated as a bigot and considered beyond the pale. But somehow treating a Jew as if he has cooties is acceptable. (Just as the Prince got a pass because of the object of his scorn, he also got a pass because he’s an Arab. Could you imagine a head of state from Europe getting a pass for refusing to shake Olmert’s hand?)
So yes I’m glad that Friedman mentioned it, but he underplays its importance.
The other surprise we need to see is moderates going all the way. Moderates who are not willing to risk political suicide to achieve their ends are never going to defeat extremists who are willing to commit physical suicide.The reason that Mr. Rabin and Mr. Sadat were so threatening to extremists is because they were moderates ready to go all the way — a rare breed. I understand that no leader today wants to stick his neck out. They have reason to be afraid, but they have no reason to believe they’ll make history any other way.
(This is a variation on Friedman’s concept of a “fanatical moderate.” Of course in Friedman’s view, Yossi Beilin is a “fanatical moderate.” I would argue that he is the former but not the latter.)
One mistake he makes here is claiming that Mahmoud Abbas is a moderate. He is not.
While it’s not clear, I suspect that Friedman’s made a second mistake. His definition of “extremist” and “moderate” will be defined by how committed each party is to the outlines of the Geneva Accord. As he wrote in his “fanatical moderate” column
The Geneva Accord fleshes out the peace initiative first outlined by President Clinton. You don’t have to accept every word to see its basic wisdom and fairness: In return for peace with Israel, the Palestinians get a nonmilitarized state in the West Bank and Gaza. They also get the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and sovereignty over the Temple Mount, but under a permanent international security force, with full Jewish access. The Israelis get to keep settlements housing about 300,000 of the 400,000 Jews in the West Bank (in return for an equivalent amount of land from Israel), including virtually all the new Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem built in the Arab side of the city. About 30,000 Palestinian refugees get to return to their homes in Israel proper, and all refugees receive compensation. Polls show 35 to 40 percent of Israelis and Palestinians already support the deal, without either government having endorsed it.
I hardly think this is a moderate position as it rewards the Palestinians for rejecting Camp David and launching a terror war against Israel. (The rejection of Camp David was not just Arafat but encouraged by such “allies” as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.) Friedman of course knows that this is the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict just as he knew that an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would lead to the dissolution of Hezbollah.
But even if we assume that this position is moderate, how would Friedman treat PM Olmert if he hesitated on some issue due to continued Palestinian non-compliance? Would Olmert still be a moderate? Or would he become an extremist in Friedman’s eyes?
Friedman’s categories of “moderate” and “extremist” are simply terms dividing actors into those who agree with him and those who don’t. Other than that, they have no real meaning. And when it comes to hesitations along the way I have no doubt who Friedman will characterize as an extremist and to whom he will give a pass.
UPDATE: via memeorandum
PrariePundit points out that Iran will be selling a different fear.
The question to be answered is whether the parties will do anything with the momentum that the conference is suppose to generate. It is possible, but the real fear that prevents an agreement is the Muslim religious bigotry that has pushed the conflict to begin with That will be the counter fear that Iran and its allies will be pushing.
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The “exploding Palestinians” that he refers to later didn’t start until two months after the Camp David summit. So we’re not out of the woods yet.Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
