Today Charles Krauthammer blasts the administration for its refusal to state the obvious in Terror — and candor in describing the Islamist ideology behind it
Instead, President Obama’s National Security Strategy insists on calling the enemy — how else do you define those seeking your destruction? — “a loose network of violent extremists.” But this is utterly meaningless. This is not an anger-management therapy group gone rogue. These are people professing a powerful ideology rooted in a radical interpretation of Islam, in whose name they propagandize, proselytize, terrorize and kill.
Why is this important? Because the first rule of war is to know your enemy. If you don’t, you wander into intellectual cul-de-sacs and ignore the real causes that might allow you to prevent recurrences.
And it’s not just the adminsitration. Currently there is a fad of foreign policy “experts” telling us that if we only meet the terrorists half way, why, they’ll embrace us with open arms.
It reminds me of Michael Kelly’s column from Sept 12, 2001 originally titled When innocents are the enemy:
If it is morally acceptable to murder, in the name of a necessary blow for freedom, a woman on a Tel Aviv street, or to blow up a disco full of teenagers, or to bomb a family restaurant — then it must be morally acceptable to drive two jetliners into a place where 50,000 people work. In moral logic, what is the difference? If the murder of innocent people is for whatever reason excusable, it is excusable; if it is legitimate, it is legitimate. If acceptable on a small scale, so too on a grand.
Whether it is this administration’s failure to call a terrorist a terrorist or those who excuse Palestinian terrorism (we don’t necessarily approve of the methods, but we understand their grievance), they’re guided by a similar problem. They see the terrorists as being just like themselves.
Charles Krauthammer wrote in 1983:
Other messages from exotic cultures are never received at all. The more virulent pronouncements of Third World countries are dismissed as mere rhetoric. The more alien the sentiment, the less seriously it is taken. Diplomatic fiascoes follow, like Secretary Shultz’s recent humiliation in Damascus. He persisted in going there despite the fact that President Assad had made it utterly plain that he rejected efforts by the U.S. (the “permanent enemy”) to obtain withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Or consider the chronic American frustration with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis consistently declare their refusal to accept the legitimacy of a Jewish state in the Middle East, a position so at variance with the Western view that it is simply discounted. Thus successive American Governments continue to count on Saudi support for U.S. peace plans, only to be rudely let down. When the Saudis finally make it unmistakably clear that they will support neither Camp David nor the Reagan plan nor the Lebanon accord, the U.S. reacts with consternation. It might have spared itself the surprise if it had not in the first place imagined that underneath those kaffiyehs are folks just like us, sharing our aims and views.
Or as Lee Smith explained it more recently:
We also learned that some Western reporters and analysts have such a deeply personal stake in their desire to understand “the other†that any suggestion that groups like Hezbollah might actually be motivated by a dangerous political ideology that has nothing in common with secular democratic norms is quite literally unbearable. One night at dinner, one of our hosts, an anti-Hezbollah Shia political activist, was criticizing the Party of God when a member of our delegation became anxious and annoyed. A researcher who has interviewed the leadership of other Islamist parties in the region, she snapped at our host and asked if he had “ever actually met someone from Hezbollah.†“Why yes,†replied the host, laughing. “I live in a Hezbollah neighborhood and have family members in Hezbollah, even Hezbollah martyrs.†Ideally, the messenger’s credentials would have at least persuaded her to listen to the message; instead, she got up and walked away from the table.
While the researcher in question was hardly displaying a devotion to open-minded inquiry, her behavior was founded on an undeniable truth: Talking to your enemy can be risky business. The greatest danger in talking is the possibility that you will be controlled by the other side’s message; or, if he’s yet more skillful, that your adversary will manage your perceptions to his advantage.
There are those who see our enemies as just like us, ready to compromise if we just are nice enough. They are motivated by the solipsism that Krauthammer describes. Unfortunately, there’s a mistaken premise here:
There were some new features, including the cigarette lighter made in China and sold on the West Bank that shows the World Trade Center on fire when clicked. There is massive documentation on the involvement of Hamas and Hizballah in terrorism, antisemitism, anti-American views, and would-be genocide. One can see videos of kids in the Hamas schools carrying out military exercises. Watch this and then ask whether Hamas is intending to produce a generation of moderates.
Revolutionary Islamism and terrorism, hatred for the United States and the desire to wipe out Israel (and Jews generally) are not some minor side issues for these groups but are absolutely central to their existence. It is amazing to think of these naïve people who think they are going to talk revolutionary Islamists into being moderates, or buy them off with money (there’s that idea of prosperity solving all problems again) or concessions.
Reaching out to meet someone halfway will only work if the other person is willing to go to meet you. If they’re only seeking advantage from you, meeting them on their own terms is a recipe for disaster.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
This is called “making yourself a picture” or “mirror imaging”. It was a very widespread delusion during the Cold War too. Lots of people made the mistake of thinking that the Soviets had the same motivations and ideas our leaders did. Instead, right up to the end, they saw themselves as the vanguard of the proletariat, leading the world revolution of Communism against Capitalism, as Edward Shevernadze, last foreign minister of the USSR, pointed out after the collapse of the USSR.
The classic case of making a picture, of course, was Neville Chamberlain.
One attraction of this sort of thing for its practitioners is that they do not have to understand the other side. All that messy learning about the other’s culture and the ideas the other side holds is short-circuited. It’s much easier to imagine that somebody like Bashir Asad, or the Hamas thugs, are motivated by goals a Westerner educated in the Ivy League or Oxbridge or the ENA can understand and relate to. These are, due to the wide influence of Marxism in our intellectual culture even among non-Marxists, primarily economic. If we get the economics right all else follows. Our elites do not understand people who will prefer war and power hunger to economic betterment for the people they lead, but that is what they must deal with. And the people are content to be led to such goals instead of economic betterment, for the goals flatter their non-economic views of themselves. Besides, they figure that once they have got the power they can get the money too, without the need to work for it.