Bias and stupidity: It’s an AP twofer!

Let us examine what constitutes analysis in today’s world of AP.

Experts: ‘Decapitation’ May Not End Terror
The Israeli assassins caught Abu Jihad in his study. They left the chief strategist of the Palestinian uprising with 170 bullets in his body. Over the next two decades, however, the movement only grew stronger, and Israel bled even more.

It’s called “decapitation,” and a missile strike in Pakistan has raised the question anew: Would eliminating Osama bin Laden and deputy Ayman al-Zawahri deal a mortal blow to the al-Qaida terror network?

“Decapitation just fuels the movement itself,” says Jenna Jordan, a University of Chicago scholar who has closely studied the historical record of such antiterrorist tactics.

“I think that is the lesson of the Israeli efforts over the years,” says Brian Jenkins, veteran terrorism analyst with the RAND Corp. research firm.

But, he quickly adds, “that doesn’t mean you don’t do it.”

First, we start with making a blanket statement about palestinian terrorists, discounting all of the external factors like, say, Iranian, Syrian, Saudi, Iraqi, and, oh, Arab/Muslim world funding. Or EU and American interference. Or any of the other million factors that have affected the “intifada” since the death of Abu Jihad.

Now let’s continue with our “expert:”

The Jan. 13 missile strike on a remote Pakistani border village showed again that the U.S. government is still trying to do it.

The early-morning attack, reportedly aimed at al-Zawahri, killed 13 villagers and possibly a few second-rank al-Qaida operatives – but not the bin Laden lieutenant. Its immediate impact could be seen in the streets of Pakistani cities, where thousands rallied, chanting “Death to America,” in support of al-Qaida’s “jihad,” or holy war.

By Thursday, bin Laden’s voice was being broadcast throughout the Muslim world, threatening a new terror strike against America.

“The Pakistan case, where you have all those people killed, that’s the kind of ‘bad press’ that keeps a movement going,” said Jordan, whose 2004 study reviewed 72 international cases, stretching back almost a century, in which militant movements’ leaders were targeted and killed.

In most cases, she found, the movements carried on – particularly if they were religion-based, like al-Qaida. Only one in five violent religious groups collapsed when their leaders were eliminated, she determined.

Still no specifics. Which groups is she talking about? What countries are they from? Where are they today? Are they still attacking and murdering innocents? Or are they just still in existence?

They’re bringing in another expert. Hold onto your hats, because I think it’s the guy who masterminded the bombing of the Sudanese drug factory. Hoo-boy, there’s an expert for you.

“Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t,” said Richard A. Clarke, who was White House counterterrorism coordinator in 1998, when U.S. missiles were fired at suspected al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan in a failed effort to kill its leaders.

“There’s no iron law,” Clarke told The Associated Press. “But the law enforcement side, the intelligence side, will always want to eliminate the leadership.”

And of course, now we go back to Israel, where we hammer the constant theme that killing terrorist leaders doesn’t stop terrorism.

One of the most spectacular “eliminations” occurred in 1988, when Israeli commandos slipped into Tunisia and stormed the exile home of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Khalil al-Wazir, known as Abu Jihad, the PLO’s No. 2 and architect of the uprising that had exploded five months earlier in Israeli-occupied territories.

Abu Jihad was killed, but the “intefadeh” went on, and by the 1990s still more Palestinian groups had joined in, followed by still more decapitations. With the latest tracking technologies, the Israelis have successfully targeted top leaders of the Hamas group in particular.

Some analysts believe this has contributed to a decline in suicide terror bombings since 2003. But the Islamic militant group’s following has grown and bombings continue. After two successive Hamas chiefs were killed in 2004, the group vowed “100 reprisals.”

“Usually these assassinated leaders are from the public, political wing, but there are many underground military commanders far from Israel’s hands,” said Islamist researcher Yasser al-Sirri, of London’s Islamic Observation Center.

I have a few questions: Has Abu Jihad managed to plan and execute any terror attacks since being found with 170 bullet holes in his body? I mean, I know that’s a silly question, but hey, it begged to be asked. As for the rest, tell me, is there a single fact in this article about the decline in terror attacks over the past several years, when Israel went on the offensive against terrorists, terrorist groups, terror supporters, and terror enablers? The decline in Hamas attacks since the top leadership was taken out? The decline in terrorist attacks since the fence went up?

No, why would there be any information like that in this article. It would interfere with the false premise, as would interviewing a single Israeli expert, or even, say, the IDF’s spokespeople, who could give them the numbers that directly contradict their thesis. Their thesis is that killing terrorist leaders doesn’t work.

I’m calling bullshit on that. Killing the masterminds means you have to pull from the ranks to replace them, and thankfully, not every Ahmed is a chemical engineer or weapons expert. So that dilutes the pool you can draw on to plan and execute attacks.

And lastly: Al Qaeda hasn’t hit us since 9/11. I’m thinking we achieved more than a little something when we went for the head of the serpent in Afghanistan.

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4 Responses to Bias and stupidity: It’s an AP twofer!

  1. Good call on this one, Meryl.

    I think the AP and their pet sources are trying to liken warfare against terrorists to the “martyr” syndrome in which a movement gets stronger after some act of violence is perpetrated against its leaders or some of its faithful.

    What they’re failing to point out is that although terrorists are, for the most part, embedded in religious movements, the martyr syndrome seems to be most likely to occur when a PEACEFUL movement is attacked. Terrorists aren’t peaceful. They’re at war. And as with ANY war, if you can kill enough enemy officers, the troops on the line will eventually fall into disarray and you can defeat them in detail.

    The AP also cites some FAILED decapitations, and tries to use them as evidence. The most recent strike in Pakistan is a great example of what happens when you miss, and when the collateral damage is high — that’s NOT what happened when Israel surgically removed Abu Jihad from his organization.

    –Howard

  2. Paul M says:

    Here are some people who think a little more deeply than AP:

    http://www.meforum.org/article/515

    (Gal Luft analyses the risks and benefits, successes and failures of targeted killing (and sees more benefits than risks))

    http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2427

    (Dichter and Ross discuss the practical, military and political considerations of targeted killing; Yaalon describes the ethical concerns that Israel also weighs.)

  3. Cynic says:

    Things carried on, even though

    Has Abu Jihad managed to plan and execute any terror attacks since being found with 170 bullet holes in his body?

    because the Arab world has continued “conscripting” homicide bombers and others to execute their terror campaign.

    The thing was to have hit Tunisia for for supplying board and lodging.

  4. uncle moishy says:

    You took AP to task for not noting that Israel’s construction of the security fence has obviously reduced terrorist incidents. But to be fair to AP, they’re only considering the question of assassinating top-dog terrorists. The fence doesn’t really fall into that category.

    As for the main thesis, history is littered with great and charismatic leaders who were ultimately succeeded by lesser luminaries (often their own children) who were not nearly as successful. If that’s the kind of guy you’ve got at the top, then there’s little question that it’s worth offing him.

    What’s not so clear is the value in wasting lieutenants. Their deaths become recruiting fodder, to be used by the leaders who still lead.

    In the case of the US in Iraq, many have noted that they seem to have taken out the #3 bad-guy more than a few times. That’s either wishful thinking on the part of US spin-doctors, or testimony that for every #3 wiped out, a new one gets promoted in short order.

    In the IDF’s case, they don’t seem to assign specific ranks to their targets, but we inevitably learn that the target has killed or is about to kill. But the IDF doesn’t always claim that the dead man held a leadership position.

    Sometime last summer, it seemed that the sheer number of IDF assassinations had taken its toll. It seemed there was almost no Hamas leadership left. But at this point it’s obvious that the snake has regrown a head. It remains to be seen whether or not it’s as “effective” terror-wise. Let’s hope not.

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