Making NIE

In his column yesterday, The myth of the mad mullahs, David Ignatius, in his typically smug fashion, goes over what the American intelligence agencies did differently to arrive at their new conclusion about the Iranian nuclear program.

The secret intelligence that produced this reversal came from multiple channels — human sources as well as intercepted communications — that arrived in June and July. At that time, a quite different draft of the Iran NIE was nearly finished. But the “volume and character” of the new information was so striking, says a senior official, that “we decided we’ve got to go back.” It was this combination of data from different sources that gave the analysts “high confidence” the covert weapons program had been stopped in 2003. This led them to reject an alternative scenario (one of six) pitched by a “red team” of counterintelligence specialists that the new information was a deliberate Iranian deception. 

A senior official describes the summer’s windfall as “a variety of reporting that unlocked stuff we had, which we didn’t understand fully before.” That earlier information included technical drawings from an Iranian laptop computer purloined in 2004 that showed Iranian scientists had been designing an efficient nuclear bomb that could be delivered by a missile. Though some U.S. analysts had doubted the validity of the laptop evidence, they now believe it was part of the covert “weaponization” program that was shelved in the fall of 2003.

The most important finding of the NIE isn’t the details about the scope of nuclear research; there remains some disagreement about that. Rather, it’s the insight into the greatest mystery of all about the Islamic republic, which is the degree of rationality and predictability of its decisions.

For the past several years, U.S. intelligence analysts have doubted hawkish U.S. and Israeli rhetoric that Iran is dominated by “mad mullahs” — clerics whose fanatical religious views might lead to irrational decisions. In the new NIE, the analysts forcefully posit an alternative view of an Iran that is rational, susceptible to diplomatic pressure and, in that sense, can be “deterred.”

 

Today’s New York Times fills in some blanks

The notes included conversations and deliberations in which some of the military officials complained bitterly about what they termed a decision by their superiors in late 2003 to shut down a complex engineering effort to design nuclear weapons, including a warhead that could fit atop Iranian missiles. 

The newly obtained notes contradicted public assertions by American intelligence officials that the nuclear weapons design effort was still active. But according to the intelligence and government officials, they give no hint of why Iran’s leadership decided to halt the covert effort.

Ultimately, the notes and deliberations were corroborated by other intelligence, the officials said, including intercepted conversations among Iranian officials, collected in recent months. It is not clear if those conversations involved the same officers and others whose deliberations were recounted in the notes, or if they included their superiors.

 

(more at memeorandum)

However, John Bolton unsurprisingly points to a number of reasons to doubt the new NIE, including the possibility of disinformation

Third, the risks of disinformation by Iran are real. We have lost many fruitful sources inside Iraq in recent years because of increased security and intelligence tradecraft by Iran. The sudden appearance of new sources should be taken with more than a little skepticism. In a background briefing, intelligence officials said they had concluded it was “possible” but not “likely” that the new information they were relying on was deception. These are hardly hard scientific conclusions. One contrary opinion came from — of all places — an unnamed International Atomic Energy Agency official, quoted in the New York Times, saying that “we are more skeptical. We don’t buy the American analysis 100 percent. We are not that generous with Iran.” When the IAEA is tougher than our analysts, you can bet the farm that someone is pursuing a policy agenda.

 

(via memeorandum)

Still even discounting Amb. Bolton’s numerous and credible concerns an article in yesterday’s Times notes that there’s still a reason to be concerned. There’s a “line” that divides between development of civilian and military nuclear programs.

One threshold is enriched uranium. Enriched to low levels, uranium can fuel a reactor that produces electrical power — which is what Tehran says it wants to do. But if uranium is purified in spinning centrifuges long enough, and becomes highly enriched, it can fuel an atom bomb. 

Another boundary between civilian and military programs is weapons design. Designing a nuclear weapon involves sophisticated mathematical and engineering work to figure out how to squeeze the bomb fuel in a way that creates the nuclear blast.

 

But here’s the tricky part.

Indeed, the most difficult part of building a bomb is not doing the secret military design work but rather the part of the process that is also crucial to civilian nuclear power — producing the fuel.

 

So the process in making weapons grade plutonium that is (apparently) most easily performed and observed is precisely the same process used to produce uranium for a nuclear plant. The only (apparent) difference is the length of time of processing.

Regardless of the possibility that Iran could still produce a nuclear weapon even if the NIE is correct, the key to the reversal in the NIE is new information, not that a new intelligence vetting process was involved.

Still Israel, officially rejects the new finding. (This is not based on the idea of the “mad mullahs” strawman that Ignatius dismisses.)

The defense minister, Ehud Barak, rejected the American assessment of “moderate confidence” that Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program by mid-2007 and that the end to the program “represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.” He suggested that Israel would not rest in its efforts to stop Iran’s activities. 

“It is our responsibility to ensure that the right steps are taken against the Iranian regime,” Mr. Barak told Israeli Army radio. “As is well known, words don’t stop missiles.”

He added: “It is apparently true that in 2003 Iran stopped pursuing its military nuclear program for a certain period of time. But in our estimation, since then it is apparently continuing with its program.”

 

But then the Times reports

Mr. Barak also said that what appeared to be the source for the American assessment on the weapons program was no longer functioning. “We are talking about a specific track connected with their weapons building program, to which the American connection, and maybe that of others, was severed,” Mr. Barak said cryptically. 

It was only on Tuesday, Israeli officials said, that Israel received and began to assess a copy of the classified American report, which is believed to run some 130 pages.

 

“The source is no longer functioning.” What does that mean?

Now that Israel has received the complete report, will it come to the same conclusions? If there’s a simple “complaining officials” explanation for the change, it would have to wouldn’t it? Or does Israel have different methods or standards for assessing a threat generally or this threat specifically?

Gerald Steinberg addresses that question in Decoding the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate …

A number of factors can explain these differences in assessments. Israel, the prime potential target for a nuclear Iran, cannot afford to take the chance of underestimating the threat, and therefore relies on what policy-makers refer to as a “worst-case” analysis. This means that the focus is on Iranian capabilities, rather than intentions, which can only be guessed.Using this approach, when Iran reaches the technological potential to produce enough fissile material necessary to make a nuclear weapon, it will be considered to be a nuclear weapons state, capable of threatening Israel with annihilation. And while the details of Iran’s weapons fabrication efforts can be hidden and are less likely to be known to intelligence agencies, the operating assumption is that there are secret facilities where this may be taking place. Indeed, Israeli analysts have long warned their U.S. counterparts about the potential for a parallel “black” Iranian weapons program, based on a small nuclear reactor producing plutonium, and following the North Korean model. Indeed, Iran is known to be constructing just such a reactor at Arak, leaving room for another undetected facility.

The consequences of a small, secret Iranian nuclear program are less significant for the U.S., given its massive military superiority over Iran. Therefore, there is more room for political factors and influence in the official U.S. estimates. After having warned of a massive Iraqi program to produce weapons of mass destruction in 2003, and then finding no evidence following the invasion, the U.S. intelligence agencies may be trying to restore their image by going to the other extreme and underestimating the pace of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. And Iran may very well continue to face difficulties in operating a very complex system of thousands of centrifuges spinning in unison and moving uranium to ever higher levels of enrichment without contamination.

 

So even if Israel is now privy to the same information, Israel apparently would be unlikely to change its assessment. For one thing Israel believes that Iran has a secret nuclear facility. (I would guess that they’d assume that the “officials complaining” was deliberate disinformation.) But even if Israel did accept the “officials complaining” scenario the fact that Israel uses a worst case analysis probably means that Israel would not change its assessment.

Israel will now have to deal with the threat posed by Iran itself and do what it can not to come into conflict with the United States.

(For more on this please see Israel Matzav, Ocean Guy, NRO’s Media Blog and JoshuaPundit.)

In addition to the question of how quickly Iran could produce a nuclear weapon if it enriched uranium, the NIE fails to clarify is when the intelligence about the “officials complaining” is from. The NY Times reported that it was discovered this past summer, but it doesn’t identify when it occurred.

Say the “officials complaining” intelligence came from 2005, then how do we know that the intelligence is up to date? That could account for the “high confidence” that the program shut down but the only “moderate confidence” that it’s still dormant. Maybe in 2003 the program was shut down for two years but was then restarted later in 2005 or maybe in 2006 after Israel failed to deal a fatal blow to Hezbollah.

Or maybe the “officials complaining” intelligence is current (or was current during the summer) but the American intelligence community rejects the Israeli intelligence about an Iranian secret nuclear program.

There are lots of gaps in the reporting (as well as in the declassified sections of the NIE) so there’s a lot of speculation. Speculation, of course, can be spun in numerous directions. The one thing I’m convinced of now, is that President Bush, for better or worse accepts the new NIE and will use it as a basis for his policy towards Iran.

Finally there are two last points that bear mentioning. Jonah Goldberg wrote yesterday:

The only test of any significance is whether the intelligence is true. And, from what I can tell, there’s no reason to be supremely confident that it is. Again, it might be. I think barring some more compelling evidence, Bush is bound to act as if it is true. But until it’s confirmed to be true it says nothing about the efficacy of post-Iraq reforms. The proof that reforms worked is if it turns out that this time the intelligence community is actually right. Period.

 

(via memeorandum)

To read Ignatius or many reporters, their working assumption is that since the new NIE downplays the threat from Iran, it must, therefore, be correct. But as Robert Baer wrote

The truth is that Iran is a black hole, and it’s entirely conceivable Iran could build a bomb and we wouldn’t know until they tested it.

 

In real life there are no Jack Bauers who will kill a dozen or so people then trick the bad guy into admitting into a wire that’s broadcast to the President’s cabinet that he manufactured the evidence and avert a war. In intelligence work, it’s becoming clear, that there are many – often competing – assumptions and a lot of incomplete information. Intelligence professionals then have to assemble the pieces as well as possible into a convincing picture. It’s naive to say that the assembly won’t be affected by personal biases and political motivations. But that works both ways.

The intelligence Iraqi WMD threat was arrived at based on whatever information and processes the intelligence community had in place at the time. So too has the the new NIE. The Iraqi threat was one of the factors – but not the only one – in convincing President Bush to go to war. Was it a mistake? I still don’t think so. Given what was known or what was thought to be known at the time, it would have been irresponsible to wait and see if Saddam could be trusted.

Now too, the NIE indicates that diplomacy is the way to go. Danger Room observes

Since the NIE says very explicitly that international pressure was instrumental in causing a halt in Tehran’s nuclear weapons research, the Bush administration may have hoped releasing the report would shore up support for continued diplomacy. Downsides to releasing the report would have applied whenever it came out; doing so this weekend at least offered one potential benefit in addition to all the problems. And the spin coming from Bush supports this theory. In his press conference Tuesday, he said “to me, the NIE…provides an opportunity for us to rally the international community—to continue to rally the community—to pressure the Iranian regime to suspend its program.”

 

(via memeorandum)

Far from proving the bad faith of the Bush administration, the NIE reversal shows the pitfalls of intelligence work. It may require a lot of highly specialized knowledge but it remains very imprecise.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.