via memeorandumfrom Bothersome Intel on Iran by Michael Hirsh, Newsweek
Israeli and other foreign officials asked Bush to explain the NIE, which concluded with “high confidence” that Iran halted what the document describes as its “nuclear weapons program.” The NIE arrived at this finding even though Tehran continues to operate uranium-enrichment centrifuges that many experts believe are intended to develop material for a bomb, and despite the CIA’s assertion that it had, for the first time, concrete evidence of such a weaponization program. Most confusing of all, the document seemed to directly contradict a 2005 NIE that concluded—also with “high confidence”—that Iran did have such a weapons program. Bush’s national-security adviser, Stephen Hadley, told reporters in Jerusalem that Bush had only said to Olmert privately what he’s already said publicly, which is that he believes Iran remains “a threat” no matter what the NIE says. But the president may be trying to tell his allies something more: that he thinks the document is a dead letter.
The final sentence is written in such a way as to indicate that President Bush has, for political reasons, ignored the professional analysis of his intelligence community. Of course the rest of the article, describing the Israeli displeasure with the conclusions of the NIE, suggest that Israel’s intelligence community came to different conclusions from the United States.
Connect the Dots points out that what President Bush is disavowing is not the NIE itself:
The NIE may be perfectly sound, but the declassified summary of it, produced at the last minute after the White House decided to release the document, is something else. By relegating to a footnote the fact that Iran has a continuing uranium-enrichment program, and by declaring flatly that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, without so much of an indication that a crucial aspect of that program — the development of fuel for a nuclear-bomb core — continues apace, the public — including America’s allies and adversaries — were baldly misled.
If Schoenfeld’s speculation is correct, then, the NIE represents less of a departure then the president’s critics, such as Hirsh portray it.
Israel Matzav looks at the implications for Israel.
There are two issues here and the only way Bush can quell that ‘rising chorus of voices’ is to resolve one of those issues and see to the resolution of the other issue. The issue Bush can resolve is the view here that the NIE shut the door on US action against Iran. Most people here believe that the NIE took the US military option against Iran off the table. If there still is a military option that the United States is prepared to use in the event that – as seems almost inevitable – sanctions will fail, that will go a long way towards quelling the ‘rising chorus of voices’ for unilateral Israeli action. A second – not nearly as satisfactory scenario – would be for Bush to make it clear that the US will support or at least not hinder Israeli military action against Iran if and when that becomes necessary.
From what I can gather, only the second option really remains. The summary of the NIE took the American option out of consideration.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
Unless, of course, the unclassified media summary is being used by the Defense Department as a cover so that the New York Times would not reveal the true plans. It appears that unless the U.S. government is ready to act with all of its most secret plans open to the enemy, something like this needs to be done.
I expect that it is the second option. With all that is going on here I’d be surprised to see the make the first strike.