The week in review of the NYT Jan 17 – 23, 1993 reported on the law that allowed Israelis to talk to the PLO like this:
On the right, the dismayed opposition warned that a group bent on Israel’s destruction had been handed legitimacy. Indeed, even before Parliament acted, the P.L.O. was looking relatively good to Israelis who worry more about Hamas, the militant fundamentalist rivals of the P.L.O.
Or consider this analysis from the same time from the Christian Science Monitor. ( US Policy Can Curb Arab Extremes, Richard C. Hottelet., Feb 10, 1993)
Five years of the Arab uprising, the intifada, have shown that military power is no solution. Instead, force has helped to build the Frankenstein’s monster of Islamic extremism. It menaces not only Israel but also Arab states whose economic distress, population pressure, incompetence and corruption have made them vulnerable to demagoguery in the cloak of religious revival. In fact, Israel , moderate Arabs, and the PLO have a common deadly enemy in Islamist radicalism.
The PLO was presented as a moderate bulwark against the extremism of Hamas. Of course, what was perhaps relative moderation (the PLO or its main constituent Fatah and its leader Yasser Arafat was willing under certain circumstances to claim that he was willing to live in peace with Israel; Hamas never made such pronouncements.)
Now the question that is before the Washington Post is whether Israel (and the world) should deal with Hamas.
Rice’s actions underscore the nuanced series of signals that are typical of Middle East diplomacy, but they also highlight the central role today of Hamas, formally called the Islamic Resistance Movement, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Now some experts — and even Israelis — are questioning whether the isolation of Hamas continues to make sense.A bipartisan group of foreign-policy luminaries, including former national security advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, issued a statement before the Annapolis peace talks in November that said, “As to Hamas, we believe a genuine dialogue with the organization is far preferable to its isolation.” The group suggested that an initial approach could be made by envoys for the United Nations or the Quartet, a peace-monitoring group. “Prompting a cease-fire between Israel and Gaza would be a good starting point,” the statement said.
Rice’s predecessor, Colin L. Powell, last year told National Public Radio that some way must be found to talk to Hamas, arguing, “I don’t think you can just cast them into outer darkness and try to find a solution to the problems of the region without taking into account the standing that Hamas has in the Palestinian community.” An aide said last week he retains that view.
So in fifteen years Hamas has gone from being beyond the pale to being essential. This begs two questions: Has Hamas changed and has Israel’s decision to talk to the PLO benefited Israel at all?
The answer to the first question is “yes.” Hamas has changed. Now it has territory and rockets, two things that it didn’t have 15 years ago. In other ways it hasn’t changed. It still seeks Israel’s destruction unwilling to offer more than a temporary truce to Israel.
Haniyeh said “all of the factions are involved,” signaling that Hamas’ call for a halt to the fighting has the support of smaller militant groups that have often scuttled cease-fire attempts in the past.Haniyeh used the word “tahdia,” or calm, to describe the informal cease-fire he sought. He did not use the Arabic word “hudna,” which is interpreted as a more formal truce. Both terms denote a temporary cease-fire rather than a permanent peace, but even the subtle differences between the words has led to fierce debate among Arabs in past cease-fire efforts.
So Hamas’s “moderation” now doesn’t even come to the level of Fatah’s selective recognition of Israel’s right to exist. And yet now dealing with it is being touted as essential to stability in the Middle East.
Did negotiating with the PLO and the subsequent Oslo Accords help Israel? The answer is almost certainly, “no.”
Using a simple measure, terrorist fatalities in Israel since 1967, we see that since Oslo, the quietest time for Israel was from 1997 to 1999 and again since 2006. The immediate effect of Oslo hurt Israel’s security. Arafat who was bound to fight terror, instead cultivated Hamas, Islamic Jihad and of course, groups affiliated with Fatah to carry out terror against Israel. Despite his promises and his rehabilitation, he remained committed to armed struggle against Israel.
Also since Oslo the standard of living of Palestinians has decreased because Arafat was too involved in accumulating power and wealthy for himself and his cronies and not building a peaceful infrastructure. So it’s not only Israel that’s suffered.
Now the world is arguing that Israel ought to deal with Hamas. Not because it’s moderated its stance but because it’s the only way to avoid worse violence. Well Israel tried that route 15 years ago and demonstrated that empowering a terror group will not moderate it. It will empower and embolden it to continue its violent ways.
Fatah, to many, now is powerless and I’m guessing that there’s a reason for that. After 2002, terror deaths in Israel declined. This was due to Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield. Israel facing a terror war, fought back. The toll was high. But Israel effectively destroyed the terror infrastructure in the West Bank. In other words, there was a military solution to the terror. If Fatah had not been committed to terror in the post-Oslo period, it would still be at near or full strength. Last year’s revolt of Hamas against Fatah in Gaza demonstrated the degree to which Fatah was weakened by Israel.
Writing in Time Magazine, Tim McGuirk argues:
For Olmert, negotiating a deal that stops rocket fire with organizations regarded as terrorists by Israel and the U.S. certainly beats the alternative: another air and ground offensive in Gaza that would end up with scores of Palestinian civilians and many Israeli soldiers dead, but wouldn’t necessarily stop the rockets.
If Israel’s experience with Fatah is instructive, it shows that terror groups can be defeated militarily. It also shows that negotiating with terror groups gives the terrorists the opportunity to organize, arm and attack. Talking with Hamas will not bring peace. It will bring a stronger Hamas. Israel needs to make a decision to wipe out Hamas, not coddle it.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
