Hamas’s no-cost triumph

Jonathan D. Halevi on what Hamas accomplished.

Hamas’ motives have nothing to do with “distress,” but rather with “opportunities” – that is, the objectives it seeks to attain in the international arena and especially in its own internal political arena. First, the lull in the fighting is meaningless for Hamas; it is not a cease-fire or a truce, but a “temporary” cessation of hostilities with Israel. Next, Hamas is not committed to continuing the lull when the six months run out, and it can use any excuse it chooses to continue its terrorist campaign: Israeli building in the settlements, Israeli measures taken in Jerusalem, or IDF anti-terror measures in the West Bank. Hamas can also send other Palestinian organizations to do its dirty work.

The tahdiya agreement for a lull is an important achievement for Hamas. Hamas will gain the recognition it wants as the legitimate ruler of the Gaza Strip. Despite the fact that the Israeli government has defined Hamas-ruled Gaza as a hostile entity, Israel agreed to the continuation of trade with it, and even recognized the hostile entity’s authority to operate the Rafah crossing. Hamas regards that as immensely important and wants to exploit it as a lever to open the door to official relations with Europe, and to have itself removed from the various lists of terrorist organizations.

Another important objective for Hamas is winning the Palestinian presidential election, which will be held when Mahmoud Abbas finishes his term of office in December. Hamas wants to present itself in the contest as a legitimate ruling body worthy of inheriting the presidency. High-ranking Hamas figures have already stated that the organization will not recognize Abbas’ authority as president after December 2008

Just as Israel is about to strengthen an Iranian proxy to its north, it has just done so to its south. While I don’t have access to the same information as Col. Halevi, I do think that to some degree that Hamas sought relief from Israeli military pressure. Of course, as Halevi notes, Hamas will not observe the terms of the agreement with Israel and use the time to re-arm.

Nicholas Kristoff thinks this is a good thing, he writes in Strengthening Extremists:

Of all the bad choices, Israel chose perhaps the worst. Punishing everyone in Gaza radicalized the population, cast Hamas as a victim, gave its officials an excuse for economic failures and undermined the moderates who are the best hope of both Israel and the Arab world.

If the U.S. and Israel had formed a Joint Commission to Support Hamas Extremists and Bolster Iranian Influence, they could hardly have done a better job. The episode is the latest evidence that hard-liners in Israel, Palestine and America all reinforce each other. Arab terrorism led to the rise of Israeli hawks and to two invasions of Lebanon. The first Israeli invasion helped give birth to Hezbollah, and then the Israeli assaults on Palestinian police helped nurture Hamas.

Israel was not punishing everyone in Gaza. In making that charge he is the one who is strengthening extremists. He is justifying Hamas.

Hezbollah and Hamas exist because ignorant “experts” like Kristoff don’t grasp that these terrorists groups don’t want exist Israel to exist. Israel talked to Fatah and strengthened Fatah and Fatah continued to commit terror, because its never changed its outlook towards Israel.

By Kristoff’s resasoning, Hezbollah should have disarmed once Israel withdrew from Lebanon. It didn’t of course. Talking to and strengthening terror groups make them more potent. Fighting them is the only to defeat them. Waiting longer to fight them means that the costs of defeating will increase.

The temporary truce will only serve to allow Hamas to re-arm and threaten even more of Israel. That’s what happened between 2000 – 2006 in the north and that’s what will happen now in Israel’s south.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.