David Ignatius hails Israel-Syrian negotiations in A surprise negotiation. There is so much wrong with this article it’s hard to know where to start.
OK, I’ll start with Noah Pollak’s observation that Ignatius:
regularly demonstrates that you can write about something for a living without understanding it
I don’t agree with Pollak’s assessment that Israel’s raid on the Syrian reactor makes it more likely that talks will succeed, his characterization of Ignatius is apt.
Lately I’ve been reading a review copy of “The Truth About Syria” by Barry Rubin. (Here’s an interview with Michael J. Totten and a review by Elder of Ziyon.) A review from me is upcoming.
Prof. Rubin’s thesis is that Syria has learned to be suited by the West. That’s how the Assad regime survives. Syria doesn’t leave obvious fingerprints on its support of terror and plays hard to get, demanding concessions from the West to support stability in the Middle East. And of course, even though the State Department classifies Syra as a state sponsor of terror, there are always those Nobel seeking politicians, credulous journalists and ambitious diplomats who see some semblance of reasonableness in the tyrants of Damascus.
Here are some of Ignatius’s points:
(3) Can Syria be decoupled from Iran?
Israel’s overriding goal has been to draw Syria away from its alliance with Iran. So far, the Israelis see no sign that the peace talks have achieved this goal. Syria-watchers caution that this sort of decisive transfer of loyalties is unlikely. But eventually, Syria may move away from Iran (and toward Turkey) because the Baath regime in Damascus is secular to its core — and mistrusts the religious fervor of the mullahs. The decoupling would be cultural and political, rather than a matter of security policy.
Really? Prof. Rubin makes the case that Syria – specifically the Assads – beneifts from the “religious fervor,” given the status of Alawites (who are not really Muslims, if I understood their description their sort of like Muslims for Jesus adopting some of the trappings of Christianity mixed in with their belief in Mohammed.) The Assads have cultivated their religious image in an attempt to mollify the Sunni majority in Syria and the Islamic world in general. Breaking with Iran would undermine Assad’s pious pose.
(4) Who assassinated Imad Mughniyah in Damascus in February?
The car bomb that killed Iran’s key covert operative in Hezbollah is still echoing in the Middle East. Suspicion immediately focused on Israel. But on Feb. 27, a London-based newspaper called Al-Quds Al-Arabi, with very good sources in Damascus, alleged that several Arab nations had conspired with Mossad to assassinate Mughniyah.
Adding to the speculation are reports that shortly before his death, Mughniyah was attempting to heal a split within Hezbollah between the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and its former leader, Subhi Tufaily. Tufaily’s power base is the Bekaa Valley, which has lost influence in Hezbollah to Shiites from southern Lebanon. According to one Arab source, Mughniyah — traveling under his longtime pseudonym, “Haj Ismail” — paid a visit shortly before his death to Tufaily’s village of Britel, just south of Baalbek.
Mughniyah usually traveled without bodyguards, believing that his protection was the surgical alteration of his features, which prevented even old friends from recognizing “Haj Ismail.” For that reason, the Syrians insisted they weren’t at fault. But a sign of tension was Tehran’s announcement that a joint commission would investigate the killing, a statement that Damascus promptly denied.
This is pure speculation. I was always skeptical of the claim that Israel killed Mughniyah. The idea that the Mossad conspired with Arab regimes in his killing. This strikes me as Uzi Mahnaimi-like speculation. Most likely Mughniyeh ran afoul of Assad.
(5) What about Syria’s secret nuclear reactor, which was destroyed by the Israelis on Sept. 6, 2007?
Oddly enough, that attack on what CIA analysts called the “Enigma Building” may have helped the peace talks. The Israelis felt that their decisive action helped restore the credibility of their deterrence policy. The Syrians appreciated that Israeli and American silence allowed them time to cover their tracks. Finally, the fact that Assad kept the nuclear effort a secret, and that he managed the post-attack pressures, showed Israelis that he was truly master of his own house, and thus a plausible negotiating partner.
Yes he’s master of his own house, but he uses that role to sow instability. The overtures to Israel worried Iran, which ended up making a new defense deal with Syria.
Getting involved in a peace process with Israel has only served to enhance Assad’s reputation in the West without requiring any tangible action on his part. It has also given leverage with his sponsor, Iran. Likely it will also get him some sort of concession from Israel that he will then claim is irrevocable, even when he fails to reciprocate.
Getting involved in a peace process for Assad is like the smoker who finds quitting easy because he does it again and again. The smoker never stops smoking and Assad will never make peace.
More at memeorandum.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
Hi SD,
A minor quibble, which surely I brought on myself by writing such a short and flippant post. I don’t think that in this case Israel-Syria talks will be successful, or that Israel’s airstrike will materially contribute to the success of the current talks.
What I meant is that, ceteris paribus, as one country’s level of deterrence increases, their ability to make peace with their enemies also increases. In other words, strength brings peace. Liberals believe somehow that weakness brings peace (see, e.g., unilateral disarmament). For Ignatius to say that Israel increasing its deterrence “oddly enough” increases its ability to make peace with hostile regimes is, well, why I said that he clearly doesn’t understand what he writes about. Ah well, he’s only a Washington Post columnist.
What a pity that Assad and his consiglieri were not overthrown in the wake of the Hariri assassination. Nobody really doubts that Syrian fingerprints are all over it. Had a total blockade of Syria, by land, by sea, and by air been imposed immediately after that event perhaps Assad and the Ba’athists could have been brought down without a war. Mind you, what replaced them would hardly have been better, but it would have been a little improved. And probably deterred from making trouble for other countries for a long while.
Missed opportunities. Now it will take a war to depose the Assad crime family. And there is no one who will do it.
There is a world of cluelessness in this (Ignatius’) article so I’ll just focus on one bit of it:
“Syria may move away from Iran (and toward Turkey) because the Baath regime in Damascus is secular to its core — and mistrusts the religious fervor of the mullahs.”
Then why the hell did Syria ever ally itself with Iran in the first place? You hear this kind of stuff all the time from smug know-nothings pretending to be know-it-alls, that different religious factions cannot be allied in the ME. Those opposing OIF use this all the time, putting everything through a Sunni vs. Shia prism. First it was the war was a mistake because Iraqi Sunnis and Shia would never form a government, now they’re claiming Iraqi Shia are 100% allied with Iran.
These morons are too dense to see the patent irony of ME politics. Yes, many of the conflicts (Muslim vs. Muslim as well as Muslim vs. Jew) are caused by religious fanaticism and intolerance. But at the same time any of these opposing factions will turn around and ally themself with their once-mortal enemy if it is in their interest. Syria is allied with Iran because they perceive it to be beneficial to them, and as long as they believe that I promise you Assad will not give a flying f*ck about what kind of crackpots the mullahs are.