Olmert and the peace process again (sigh)

The NYT follows up with another article showing what I observed yesterday, that Olmerts resignation is being viewed not in terms of security considerations, but in terms of the peace process. Today we have Israel’s Political Situation Dims Hopes for Peace Deal

“It’s over,” said David Makovsky, an analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “Rice was counting on the fact that Olmert’s dwindling political fortunes would lead him to turn to a diplomatic victory as a springboard toward a political comeback. But if he’s leaving office, that doesn’t happen.”

A few officials at the State Department expressed the slim hope that Mr. Olmert, now freed of the political shackles that make concessions so difficult, could turn his lame-duck status into an asset and strike a peace bargain with Mr. Abbas.

There’s something very disturbing about the State Department’s sentiment, if it’s correct. In other words the State Department wanted a lame duck political leader to strike a deal that went against the perceived interests of his constituents.

Noah Pollak argues that the early end to the administration’s peace making is a good thing:

In a way, this is not too tragic an end to the Annapolis process. It goes out not with a bang, but a whimper, with various diplomatic structures left in place so that the next Israeli and American governments can resume this perfunctory exercise without all the foolish fanfare that has marked the commencement of past efforts. Maintaining the drip-drip-drip of the peace process seems to have become a diplomatic necessity for American administrations. This iteration of it seems likely to fade into the background without the violence and death of its predecessors.

The Economist’s former Israel correspondent, Gideon Lichfield, blogs:

It’s ironic and sad that the only way to make an Israeli prime minister (and, while we’re at it, a Palestinian president) take peace talks seriously is to make his or her political survival hang by a thread. Which is why I’m kinda glad I don’t have to write about this stuff any more. And yet I can’t help doing it anyway…

Let’s see. Oslo was signed after Rabin had been in power for a year. The Hebron Accords were signed six months after Netanyahu became PM. That’s hardly when the survival of either was hanging by a thread. Though every Prime Minister has gotten reckless at the end of his term of office trying to make some even bigger deal – even without public support – every Israeli Prime Minister since 1992 has been serious about peace talks throughout his term. Failing to reach terms with irridentists like Arafat or Abbas is not a sign of a lack of seriousness. It’s just not possible.

Lichfield can complain as much as he wants about Israel’s leadership, but if he were honest he’d see that where Netanyahu is now is where Peace Now was 20 years ago. Frankly, it doesn’t matter what Israel has conceded, it hasn’t led to reciprocal moderation among either the Palestinian leadership or people.

If after 15 years of peace making the “moderate” leader of the Palestinians can only make an official statement in honor of a murderer and not to Israel, he is not at all moderate and it’s little wonder that the Israeli people have no trust in him or his intentions.

So yes, Olmert’s resignation may adversely affect the trappings of a peace process, but peace remains as elusive as ever until there is a true change of Palestinian hearts.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.