Saving Hamas by diplomacy

Shortly after Hamas won the PA elections, nearly three years ago, the Washington Post ran an editorial, Hamas’s Choice. The editors of the Post wrote:

Many Palestinians who voted for Hamas don’t support the Islamists’ fundamentalist agenda: Polls show that large majorities want an end to violence and a resumption of peace talks with Israel. Wednesday’s vote was not an embrace of extremism, but — as President Bush suggested yesterday — a rejection of the corrupt and incompetent clique of leaders left behind by Yasser Arafat. Since Arafat’s death more than a year ago, his Fatah movement had been unable to reform itself or control its violent elements, despite the good intentions of Mr. Abbas. Now, perhaps, a new generation of secular leaders will be able to purge Fatah and prepare to offer Palestinians a better alternative, while crooks and armed thugs are cut from the government’s payroll. Mr. Abbas himself should remain in office, as Mr. Bush urged yesterday, and will retain considerable power to check a Hamas-led government.

This is actually false, as Khaled Abu Toameh recently wrote:

Back then, Hamas ran in the parliamentary election under the banner of Change and Reform. Its leaders promised the Palestinians good government and an end to financial corruption. But Hamas also promised the Palestinians that it would “pursue the resistance against the Israeli enemy.” It also pledged never to recognize Israel’s right to exist in this part of the world.

To its credit, Hamas did not hide its agenda. Its leaders were very clear in the messages they sent to the Palestinian public and the international community. Hamas’s message was the same in Arabic and English.

Despite evidence to the contrary, at the time, the editors of the Post persisted in claiming that the election was about Fatah’s corruption not about Hamas’s commitment to destroy Israel. So later they wrote:

Hamas’s eagerness to avoid hard choices was evident in the swiftness with which its leaders proposed yesterday to form a “unity” government with Fatah despite the Islamists’ control of 76 of the 132 seats in the legislature. The two parties will have to forge some agreement on security, since each effectively controls its own armed forces, with those of Fatah now funded by the government; war between the two is a danger.

For the editors of the Post Hamas had a hard choice to make. After all they supported the election that brought Hamas to power. But if the editors of the Post thought that Hamas would have to choose between peace with pragmatism and continued terror, they were deluding themselves. An organization does not readily cede its raison d’etre.

Yesterday’s editorial, Escalation in Gaza, shows the same self-deception is still in play.

The problem is that Israel probably cannot end the rocket fire by military means alone. Nor, without toppling the Hamas government and reoccupying part or all of Gaza, can it unilaterally ensure that Hamas does not rebuild its arsenal once the current fighting ends. To win this mini-war, Israel will have to rely on the United States, Egypt, Turkey or possibly European governments to broker a settlement. By that measure, a victory for Israel still appears uncertain — and the ground attack may not help its cause.

Allowing Hamas to compete in the elections is one of the causes of the current violence. Hamas, in its campaign showed that it was not interested in accepting the niceties of democratic government. It won’t be easy for Israel to win, but defeating Hamas will have to be part of the solution. Diplomacy hasn’t worked.

Hamas is unreceptive because it hopes to replicate what it sees as the success of Hezbollah during its 2006 battle with Israel in Lebanon. The Shiite militia gained political power in Lebanon and prestige around the Middle East simply by surviving the Israeli assault. Israel has been drawn into escalating its offensive so as to force Hamas to settle. On Thursday and Friday it began bombing the homes of Hamas leaders, killing one senior figure; yesterday armored columns drove across the border to begin what will likely be a costly battle with entrenched Hamas fighters. While justified by Hamas’s continuing attempts to kill Israeli civilians, the invasion heightens the risks that Israel has faced all along. Even a defeat of Hamas on the ground might not end the missile threat, and it could be forced into a full-scale occupation of Gaza. That outcome would be a serious blow to Israel’s larger interests — and those of the United States.

Instead of conceding that a defeat of Hamas woujld be good for Israel (and for American interests) the Post’s editors fret about what would happen if Israel would re-occupy Gaza. I’m not convinced that that would be the disaster the Post’s editors feel that it was, but would it be worse than the disengagement was?

A defeat of Hamas, including the killing or capture of its leadership would be the first step. No it may not stop all rocket fire. On the other hand an organization that loses its leadership and specialists will be hard pressed to continue operating at top efficiency. Diplomacy, until now, is what’s allowed Hamas to build its threat against Israel. Recall that in late 2006, Israel was hesitant to open up all of Gaza’s border crossings.

Although tunneling in the area is as old as the border itself, Israeli military officials say higher-grade weapons are flowing through the passages to various Palestinian militias, whose arsenals until now have been relatively modest.

“These groups are constantly trying to expand and improve their weapons,” said Capt. Noa Meir, an Israeli military spokeswoman. “It would not be incorrect to say they are learning from Hezbollah.”

The Israeli military has presented little tangible evidence to support the claim. Palestinian officials say the military is citing the tunnels to argue for a large operation in Gaza that could help rehabilitate its reputation after the Lebanon experience. Israel’s security cabinet earlier this week ordered the military to prepare plans for a large operation.

Try as the Post’s reported did to dismiss Israel’s fears,the Israeli claim has been substantiated by events. Israel gave in to diplomacy and opened the Philadelphi corridor and that hampered its ability to stop the flow of weaponry into Gaza. So it is diplomacy and inaction that led to this war. Had Israel not had its hands tied from preventing the arming of Hamas, Israel’s citizens would not be under the threat they are now under. And Hamas would have neither the power nor the resources it now has. Those must be degraded for Israel to be safe.

It’s a little late in the game to hope that diplomacy will save Hamas. It is diplomacy that has strengthened Hamas and made it a threat to hundreds of thousands of Israelis. The editors of the Post have learned nothing.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.