Jackson Diehl starts off his latest (outrageous) column, A promise of War, with:
The past four Israeli elections have been won by a candidate who promised to end Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians. Tomorrow, for the first time in decades, Israelis may choose a prime minister who is promising to wage war.
The past four elections, that would be (in reverse order) Olmert, Sharon, Sharon and Barak. Yes Ariel Sharon promised peace, but in 2001, what he clearly promised was security, which, if Diehl remembers, was in the middle of the “Aqsa intifada,” which Arafat launched after failing to come to a peace agreement with Ehud Barak in 2000. Sharon won by campaigning that Barak’s diplomatic overtures to the Palestinians had been too generous. I don’t think that in 2001, the candidate “promising peace” was the one who proved victorious. And in 2003, Sharon won by campaigning against disengagement from Gaza, which he ended up adopting later. So it’s hard to see how Diehl’s snarky but superficial observation is correct.
(And I would conclude that fighting against Palestinian in terror did more to create peace – or the conditions for peace – than did the disengagement. But that requires an extra degree of analysis, something that Diehl isn’t interested in.)
What is Netanyahu for? Here’s Biur Chametz demonstrating an ability to comprehend what candidates are actually saying as opposed to projecting his prejudices onto Netanyahu.
From the Likud this time around I hear a substantial – and refreshing – change of tone. No more talk about working for a negotiated settlement or expectations of peace. Netanyahu is talking soberly about the challenges we face and the hard choices to be made. No more “I’ll bring you peace with security, or security with peace.” Netanyahu has put forward a plan for “economic peace”, suggesting that in the absence of real prospects for a diplomatic agreement we work on agreed steps to help the Palestinian economy. Frankly, I think that’s a crock, but it’s a potential way to maintain a diplomatic track which doesn’t entail unrealistic expectations or unacceptable demands. In other words, it may be a way to buy time while filling the diplomatic void with something concrete.
This is basically in line with what Barry Rubin writes (complete article here):
What is Israel’s consensus policy for the next government?
–To stress that we want peace, are ready for a Palestinian state, aren’t responsible for the conflict and violence continuing.
–To maintain deterrence and defend ourselves.
–To preserve the best possible relations with the United States, Europe, and other countries as long as it does not involve risks to Israeli national interests and citizens.
–Security cooperation with the PA to prevent terrorist attacks on Israel in exchange for helping them economically and against Hamas to ensure that it doesn’t take over the West Bank. Without illusions regarding Fatah and the PA, this effort seems to be working.
–To decide when to strike back at Hamas—and potentially Hizballah—based on any attacks on us. Precise response depends on timing, opportunity, and their behavior.
–To work for the isolation of Iran, Hizballah and Hamas.
Prof Rubin writes further:
Where are the main differences among the leading parties? They are more atmospherics than real: offering small concessions; making small demands. If much of the election revolves around personalities that is because strategy and policy are not hugely different among them. Bibi isn’t going to embark on a settlement-building campaign; Tzipi isn’t going to give away east Jerusalem.
The rest of Diehl’s column is Bibi-bashing fest. Hey, I’m not going argue that he was a great Prime Minister, but at least take the time to get things right instead of flinging as much as you can and seeing what sticks.
But here’s the Diehl’s central point:
In short, just at the moment that a new U.S. administration launches a policy aimed at addressing the multiple conflicts of the Middle East with intensive diplomacy, it may find itself with an Israeli partner that rejects negotiations with its neighbors and does its best to push the United States toward military confrontation with Iran and its proxies.
The chutzpah of Israel (or Bibi) for looking out for his nation’s interests!
At the end of his rant, Diehl leaves us with a story:
Still, it’s worth passing on Ross’s recollection of the last Israeli election night in which Netanyahu figured, on May 17, 1999. As Ross tells it in “The Missing Peace,” Abbas was staying at the Ritz-Carlton in Pentagon City, and the two men agreed to watch the returns together. When Ross arrived, Abbas greeted him by saying: “Either we toast the outcome or we jump out the window together.” Netanyahu lost in a landslide, but Ross warned the jubilant Abbas, “In Israeli politics never say never . . . if there is a catastrophe [Netanyahu] can come back.” You have to wonder if the Palestinian president and the Obama administration’s new Middle East counselor will be standing by their windows tomorrow night.
When Netanyahu was elected in 1996, the peace process had no credibility because it was premised on Arafat’s purported change from terrorist to statesman. No such change took place and Israel was subjected to higher levels of terror in the two and a half years after Oslo than it had seen in years. When Barak defeated Netanyahu it was because during Netanyahu’s term in office, terror was down; the Israeli electorate was no longer afraid of concessions. During his term, the economic situation of the Palestinians improved and he ceded most of Hevron to Palestinian Authority control. In short, Netanyahu did a lot more to advance the peace process than he’s generally credited with. And he also has done a lot more than Abbas ever did. Abbas is an ineffectual party man whose main qualification is that he wasn’t Arafat and that he’s not now Hamas. He never opposed terror against Israel.
That Ross would consider Abbas more of a kindred spirit than Netanyahu, says a lot more about Ross and similarly minded peace-processors than it does about Netanyahu. That Diehl finds this story significant – when the Arafat was still alive – says something about him too. He’s for a process, but he can hardly be said to be for peace.
For comparison I wrote a post in advance of the 2006 Israeli elections criticizing a Washington Post editorial on the topic. Diehl, who contributes to the editorials, didn’t view Olmert much better then, than he portrays Netanyahu now. By now, it should be clear to anyone objective that peace isn’t in Israel’s hands to make. First and foremost the Palestinians have to change their orientation and take responsibility for building a functioning state. Whether peace will result from that will depend on what kind of state they build.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
