A high degree of confidence

In late 2007 the United States intelligence agencies issue a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had stopped seeking to build a nuclear weapon. In a column The myth of the Mad Mullahs, David Ignatius wrote that the most important finding of the NIE was not the stoppage of Iranian work on a nuclear weapon.

For the past several years, U.S. intelligence analysts have doubted hawkish U.S. and Israeli rhetoric that Iran is dominated by “mad mullahs” — clerics whose fanatical religious views might lead to irrational decisions. In the new NIE, the analysts forcefully posit an alternative view of an Iran that is rational, susceptible to diplomatic pressure and, in that sense, can be “deterred.”

“Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs,” states the NIE. Asked if this meant the Iranian regime would be “deterrable” if it did obtain a weapon, a senior official responded, “That is the implication.” He added: “Diplomacy works. That’s the message.”

While the intelligence community regards Iran as a rational actor, the workings of the regime remain opaque — a “black box,” in the words of one senior official. “You see the outcome [in the fall 2003 decision to halt the covert program] but not the decision-making process.” This official said it was “logical, but we don’t have the evidence” that Iran felt less need for nuclear weapons after the United States toppled its mortal enemy, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, in April 2003.

Of course given the opacity of the decision making process, it could also be that they stopped pursuing nuclear weapons in 2003 because they feared the United States, and that as fear of the Americans dissipated they started their program up again.

Now it’s being reported that, whoops, the Iranians are indeed pursuing nuclear weapons (via memeorandum)

Obama’s nominee to serve as CIA director, Leon E. Panetta, left little doubt about his view last week when he testified on Capitol Hill. “From all the information I’ve seen,” Panetta said, “I think there is no question that they are seeking that capability.”

The language reflects the extent to which senior U.S. officials now discount a National Intelligence Estimate issued in November 2007 that was instrumental in derailing U.S. and European efforts to pressure Iran to shut down its nuclear program.

So if the NIE was wrong doesn’t that mean that mullahs are mad after all?

As the administration moves toward talks with Iran, Obama appears to be sending a signal that the United States will not be drawn into a debate over Iran’s intent.

“When you’re talking about negotiations in Iran, it is dangerous to appear weak or naive,” said Joseph Cirincione, a nuclear weapons expert and president of the Ploughshares Fund, an anti-proliferation organization based in Washington.

Cirincione said the unequivocal language also worked to Obama’s political advantage. “It guards against criticism from the right that the administration is underestimating Iran,” he said.

So this new information doesn’t change the Obama administration’s initiative at all? It just protects it form the “right?”

More from Hot Air, Israel Matzav, Mere Rhetoric and Jules Crittenden who writes:

My big question is still how Obama avoids appearing weak or naive. On the second part, I’d be inclined to say that by seeking to give the mullahs equal standing with the Great Satan in direct talks, sure, there is an underestimation of their deviousness and unreliability, but there is also a gross overestimation of their goodwill.

Emanuele Ottolenghi at Contentions sums it up:

Future historians will have a field day with those hapless intelligence experts who drafted the NIE in such a way as to wipe out any residual credibility of a U.S. military strike against Iran in the last year of George W. Bush’s presidency, thereby also undermining sanctions efforts by the rest of the international community — especially if it turns out that the NIE helped push Iranian scientists to the finish line this year.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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4 Responses to A high degree of confidence

  1. can you believe this madness from deecee?

    [Federal Register: February 4, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 22)]
    [Presidential Documents]
    [Page 6115]
    From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
    [DOCID:fr04fe09-106]

    Presidential Documents

    [[Page 6115]]

    Presidential Determination No. 2009-15 of January 27,
    2009

    Unexpected Urgent Refugee and Migration Needs
    Related To Gaza

    Memorandum for the Secretary of State

    By the authority vested in me by the Constitution and
    the laws of the United States, including section
    2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of
    1962 (the “Act”), as amended (22 U.S.C. 2601), I
    hereby determine, pursuant to section 2(c)(1) of the
    Act, that it is important to the national interest to
    furnish assistance under the Act in an amount not to
    exceed $20.3 million from the United States Emergency
    Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund for the purpose
    of meeting unexpected and urgent refugee and migration
    needs, including by contributions to international,
    governmental, and nongovernmental organizations and
    payment of administrative expenses of Bureau of
    Population, Refugees, and Migration of the Department
    of State, related to humanitarian needs of Palestinian
    refugees and conflict victims in Gaza.

    You are authorized and directed to publish this
    memorandum in the Federal Register.

    (Presidential Sig.)

    THE WHITE HOUSE,

    Washington, January 27, 2009

    [FR Doc. E9-2488
    Filed 2-3-09; 8:45 am]

    Billing code 4710-10-P

  2. Michael Lonie says:

    Sadly, I can. When I read about this I sent The One an email asking a policy question: Are you out of your mind? I have not received an answer, but if it was honest it would be yes.

    Remember how Gazans manned phone banks to canvass for Obama votes? He’s paying off his friends. Watch out Israel.

    As for the NIE, those intel “experts” were not hapless, they knew exactly what they were doing. They were sabotaging the policy of the Administration that governed the country they were obliged to serve because they did not like their Constitutional boss, President Bush. Now they have one more to their taste, one who shares their policy preferences for appeasement.

    Obama has made a good start for the Second Coming of the Carter Administration, wrecking foriegn policy, social policy (the “Stimulus Bill” reverses the successful welfare reform of the 90s), and economic policy. The Mullahs will walk all over him, and he won’t have a clue as to what happened. Neither will all his expert advisors, who live in a bizarro world of mirror imaging and unrealism.

  3. Alex Bensky says:

    Nothing to worry about. The Economist pointed out that even if…or when…Iran gets an atomic bomb, Israel’s fears are unnecessary because Iran “probably” won’t use it on Israel.

  4. Michael Lonie says:

    So Alex, what information did the Economist publish to controvert the explicit statements of Ahmedinejad about wiping Israel off the map, or Hashemi Rafsanjani, who said in 2001 that when “Islam” got a nuke it would eliminate the Zionist enemy with a single bomb on Tel Aviv? No doubt the Economist’s awesome news gathering abilities have provided it with denfinite, accurate, and unequivocal proof that these statements are not Iranian policy.

    By the way, Americans and British should be worried about Iranian bombs too. The policy of the Iranian government is “Death to the Great Satan” and has been since 1979. That’s us, for anybody who doesn’t know. By that they mean that the US should be destroyed. And an Iranian official has declared that the Iranian government has a special branch set up to plan how to destroy Britain.

    You can talk about all this being bluster. People talked about Hitler’s talk being bluster too, that he really did not mean it. I regard what Presidents of Iran (and other officials) say as evidence of what they think, and indicators of how they will act when they get the capability.

    If it turns out to be a matter of survival, them or us, I prefer that we survive. Call me old-fashioned, but I doubt even the liberals, even the airheaded celebrities who have been so ignorantly critical of the Bush Administration for so long, would actually choose differently when push came to shove. If they had the wits to recognize when that was, of course.

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