Barry Rubin identifies two types of unrealistic realists
This is explained by saying that the practitioners weren’t good enough–“I’m smarter or more charming than they were,” which today seems to be what President Barack Obama is saying–or didn’t try hard enough–how could anyone have tried harder than President Bill Clinton? Or perhaps there’s some brilliant solution that will make the conflict over east Jerusalem go away and somehow square quite a lot of circles.
These are the moderate peace processers.
Then there are those who think that it has been Israel or U.S. support for Israel which has stopped the Arab states that desperately want to solve the issue. This urgent effort has been sort of hard to find but a blend of ignorance, avid reading of Arab propaganda, wishful thinking, and anti-Israel (or anti-Jewish) thinking in wildly differing proportions makes the mirage take on three dimensions.
These are the extremists who often end up as allies, or at least enablers, of radical Islamist movements and terrorists.
The essay, World Watches for U.S. Shift on Mideast by Helene Cooper fits into the latter category. The essay is mis-titled because, for Cooper, the world really has gotten much smaller. Cooper interviewed four people for the article, Aaron David Miller, Daniel Levy Ali Abunimah, and Charles W. Freeman. Given Miller’s demonstrated antipathy for PM Netanyahu and the dislike the other two have demonstrated towards Israel, I’d hardly consider their views to be representative of the “world.”
Miller, perhaps unsurprisingly, gives a pretty diplomatic answer describing what Netanyahu has to consider going into his meeting with President Obama. Levy expresses his hope:
“… But what I think might be different is a familiarity that I think President Obama almost certainly has with where the Palestinian grievance narrative is coming from.”
Abunimah expresses skepticism that President Obama will deviate from the American pro-Israel positions of the past. And Freeman expects the President Obama will eventually change adopt a more pro-Palestinian position, but that it may not be immediately.
Cooper refers to Freeman’s aborted nomination and ascribes it to opposition based on Freeman’s “…irrational hatred of Israel.” Was that the reason for the opposition? Surely he was a poor choice because he is anti-Israel. But he also had unusually strong ties to Saudi Arabia and China that might have compromised his objectivity. An investigation into some of dealings was pending when Freeman withdrew, suggesting that it wasn’t his anti-Israel leanings that sunk his appointment. Still Freeman’s recollection of his failed nomination is kind of jarring, ungracious and unprofessional:
“You can’t really tell anything by what happened to me and the fact that he didn’t step forward to take on the skunks…”
“Skunks?” Maybe his antipathy towards Israel really is irrational. That hardly seems like good form for someone who was considered for a top intelligence post.
Clearly Cooper believes that the Palestinian grievances haven’t gotten enough attention in American policy before now.
Glenn Kessler, for his part provides a more dispassionate preview of the Obama-Netanayahu meeting. In other words he avoids giving exclusive attention to the “pressure Israel for peace” crowd in Obama and Netanyahu to meet at White House. Kessler, for his part, also mentions that Netanyahu suffered politically for his handling of the budget. As far as the talks with President Obama go, he writes:
Although Netanyahu has hesitated to commit to the diplomatic code of a “two-state solution,” his government has reaffirmed its support of the “road map” that would result in a Palestinian state. Netanyahu has also stressed his interest in improving the Palestinian economy and institutions, arguing he can do more on those fronts than his predecessors did. The Obama administration appears willing to pocket those ideas as a down payment for more sustained peace efforts later, assuming Netanyahu’s government survives through the year.
Iran’s nuclear program will be the other major issue on the table. Netanyahu has spoken of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program in almost apocalyptic terms, disputing milder U.S. assessments of Iran’s progress. But he has also indicated a willingness to let Obama experiment with engagement as long as there is a firm deadline for ending diplomacy and moving toward more aggressive actions.
Obama is unlikely to agree to any such deadline, fearing it would hamstring diplomacy. But U.S. and European officials have privately said that if Iran fails to begin serious talks by September or October — the period when the U.N. General Assembly meets — the administration and its allies will shift direction and seek to impose tough sanctions on Iran. For Netanyahu, that may be good enough, especially if his aides can leak to the media that Obama had that type of timetable in mind, Lewis said.
Of course the weakness in both presentations is that the considerations of the Arab world – outside of pressuring Israel – aren’t taken into account. Rubin writes:
–And for the revolutionaries, the Israel issue has been of great benefit. But the problem here is that they win either way. If the relative moderates demonize Israel and justify the conflict, the masses are being prepared further for the radicals’ message. And they can ask: Why haven’t the regimes wiped Israel off the map?
But if the regimes move toward peace, the revolutionaries declare them to be traitors and have an even better chance at overthrowing them. Certainly, at least, that’s what the rulers believe.
Both articles work from an assumption that it is changes made by Israel that are necessary to make peace. (The Kessler article at least acknowledges that Arab regimes could play a role in encouraging Israel.) In truth it isn’t Israel that needs to change, but the Arab regimes that must change. Since 1993 they haven’t changed regardless of what Israel’s done. There’s no reason to assume that they will change now.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
