In Upping the ante on Israel, David Ignatius notes that President Obama has asked the Arab world to start normalization with Israel.
To give Israel some quick tangible benefits, the United States wants the Arabs to begin normalizing relations with the Jewish state. Jordan’s King Abdullah describes this promise of recognition by the Arab League nations as a “23-state solution.”
The key to this front-loading strategy is Saudi Arabia. But the Saudis warn privately that they won’t normalize anything unless Israel makes some dramatic moves — such as freezing settlements in the occupied West Bank — that demonstrate its commitment to the 2003 “road map” for peace.
To break this logjam, the Obama administration appears ready to lean hard on Netanyahu. Obama has a range of options, starting with criticism of Israel for failing to meet the road map conditions and escalating to tougher measures.
Aside from the irony of a repressive monarchy deciding when Israel is moral enough to speak to, the problem with Ignatius’s formulation is that Israel (and presumably the United States) has/have a much different view of what constitute “settlements” than what the Saudis and the Arab League do. If President Obama adopts the Saudi definition, that would constitute a major change in American policy, but if he doesn’t the Saudis will still have their pretext for doing nothing.
It’s interesting that for seven years the Saudis have had their “peace plan” on the table, and only now someone’s asking them for a down payment to show their good faith. Of course if Ignatius is correct, the Saudis are still demanding something tangible and permanent from Israel even before they grant Israel the courtesy of acknowledging its existence.
(Barry Rubin doesn’t think that the difference between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu are so far apart.
On Israel’s side he said settlements have to be stopped–though there are no new settlements or expanding of settlements in territorial terms, a point that often is forgotten. There has to be reconstruction of Gaza along with an end to rocket attacks, which means a loosening of border controls.
This is not so difficult for Israel to accomplish: close down some outposts, remove new settlement efforts, and revise the border controls on Gaza. These are all things Netanyahu is quite prepared to do to maintain good relations with the United States.
I don’t think that changing the border controls on Gaza is without risk.)
It’s hard to read Ignatius without getting the impression that he does want the United States to pressure Israel, regardless of consequences.
Netanyahu knew Obama was a rare politician when they first met in March 2007. Back then, nobody was giving the Illinois senator much of a chance, but the Likud leader told his aides: “I think this is the next president of the United States.” Now Netanyahu faces the full force of the Obama political phenomenon — a president who feels politically secure enough to ignore the usual rules of the U.S.-Israel relationship and push hard for what he thinks is right.
Of course, just because President Obama (and David Ignatius) thinks it’s right, doesn’t make it so. Absent any serious movement on the part of the Palestinians or the Arab world in general, there will be no Middle East peace, no matter how hard Obama leans on Bibi.
The Washington Post, editorially, also advocates the “pressure Israel” approach to Middle East peacemaking:
It may be that a mere show of U.S. sleeve-rolling on the peace process, along with pro forma Israeli cooperation, will provide adequate cover for Arab states that are eager to join in an anti-Iranian alliance. That is what Mr. Netanyahu is calculating. If Mr. Obama genuinely intends to press for an early Israeli-Palestinian settlement, he will have to push U.S.-Israeli relations into a red zone of tension for the first time in many years. He would do well to make clear to Israeli voters that any government that will not explicitly embrace Palestinian statehood or an end to settlements will not have smooth relations with Washington. Even if that does not lead to a Middle East peace, it could help lay the groundwork for one in the future.
This begs the questions:
And if Israel were to take risks and make concessions will they be reciprocated? And if the United States and Europe makes promises to Israel will they be kept?
After all, the 1990s’ peace process taught Israelis the answer was “no” on both counts.
This is Israel’s central point: peace, yes, but only a real, lasting, and stable situation which makes things better rather than worse.
But is it Israeli voters and an Israeli government that need to get the message? Certainly over the past sixteen years, they’ve gotten a much different message, that concessions will be pocketed with no reciprocation and that moves for peace are utilized for terror.
Of course both Ignatius and the editors of the Post accept the flawed premise that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at the center of the instability in the Middle East and that, therefore, quick action is needed. The problem with this reasoning is:
what if Israeli-Palestinian peace will take many years to accomplish, but the Iranian nuclear bomb will only take a year or two to accomplish? Obama essentially proposes that America will race the Iranians — our peace process versus their nuclear program. Does anyone wonder who will win?
At best Israeli-Arab peace is still a long term process. Even if American pressure on Israel brings the desired concessions from Israel, there won’t be a final peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the next four years. On the other hand the Iranian threat will continue to grow and become more serious. If those rooting for an American-Israeli confrontation get their wish, chances peace will become even more remote as Arab intransigence and Iranian power grow.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
