When I first read this analysis of Lebanese President Sa’ad Hariri’s trip to Syria, Lebanon Drama Adds Act With Leader’s Trip to Syria , I was astonished by its anodyne language. After all what was being described was the capitulation once again of Lebanon to Syria. And yet the reporter focused on the “symbolism” of the visit.
For many Lebanese, the visit was a measure of Syria’s renewed influence over Lebanon after years of bitterness and struggle since the Syrian military’s withdrawal in 2005. That withdrawal came after Mr. Hariri’s father, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, was killed in a car bombing that many here believe to have been ordered by Syria.
The withdrawal was a blow to Syrian prestige, and afterward Saad Hariri seemed to have the entire Western world at his back as he built a movement for greater Lebanese independence and pushed for an international tribunal to try his father’s killers.
But since then, the United States and the West have chosen to engage with Syria, not isolate it. And Saudi Arabia, which has long backed Mr. Hariri and competed with Syria for influence here, reconciled with the Syrians earlier this year, leaving them a freer hand to guide politics in Lebanon as they once did.
All this has been known for months, but it was still tremendously important for Mr. Hariri to actually cross the mountains — in his first visit since before his father’s killing — and pay his respects in Damascus.
“The image of Syrian soldiers retreating was a huge blow to them,†said Elias Muhanna, a political analyst and the author of the Lebanese blog Qifa Nabki. “So the image of Hariri coming over the mountains means they’ve come full circle. It demonstrates to all the power centers in Damascus that Bashar has restored Syria’s position of strength vis-à -vis Lebanon.â€
I suppose that the quote from Elias Muhanna doesn’t sugarcoat anything but casting the Hariri’s meeting with Assad as an act in a play dimishes the significance of Hariri’s action.
David Schenker, in the Murdered Father’s club eschews phony dramatic terminology.
So Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt, the leaders of the Cedar Revolution, whose fathers were all but certainly killed by Syria, are paying homage to Damascus. For Jumblatt, it was a pragmatic decision. For Hariri, it’s a decision taken under extreme pressure, and one fraught with political ramifications. Not only will the visit be seen as a humiliation by Hariri’s Lebanese Sunni supporters, it will likely be understood as Hariri absolving Damascus of responsibility for the murder of his father, a perception that could undermine support for the International Tribunal. Hariri is trying to mitigate the negative consequences of his trip by visiting Riyadh and Cairo prior to Damascus, but this will not blunt the impact.
Given Syrian resilience, perhaps this development was to be expected. After all, despite no perceptible change in Syrian behavior, and its ongoing violation of UN Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, Europe has made great efforts to improve relations with Damascus. In November 2009, the EU offered Syria an Economic Association agreement, essentially removing all human rights clauses from the pact to sweeten the deal for the authoritarian state.
Washington’s increased diplomatic and military engagement with Damascus also appears to have had an effect, decreasing March 14 confidence in its most ardent supporter. Perhaps the leading factor in March 14 leadership’s decision to return to Damascus, however, appears to be Saudi Arabia’s equivocating. Riyadh had been a leading force in trying to dissuade Damascus from playing its traditionally pernicious role in Lebanon. Recently, however, Saudi appears to have made a concession on Lebanon in order to improve relations with Syria.
It’s not exactly clear why Riyadh cut the deal with Damascus, but it appears that the decision was driven by concerns over Iran. To mitigate the threat posed by Tehran, Saudi Arabia is attempting to pry Syria away from its 30-year strategic ally, and the first Saudi down-payment in this ill-advised gambit has been its Lebanese allies. At least in part, this dramatic change in policy vis-Ã -vis Syria is related to the perceived U.S. weakness on Iran. Absent Saudi confidence that Washington will prevent a nuclear Iran, Riyadh is hedging.
Syria’s resurgent domination of Lebanese politics, then, is the result of a number of factors. One of which is the American rapproachment with Syria. Limited as that outreach has been it still has had an effect. Michael Young, a Lebanese columnist, wrote this three years ago:
But perhaps the best reason to isolate Syria is Lebanon. Assad’s deepest desire is to re-establish Syrian hegemony here. One reason for this, aside from Lebanon’s ability to again grant Syria regional relevance, is the United Nations’ investigation of Rafik Hariri’s murder. All the signs are that Syria will be accused of the crime, which could bring down the Assad regime. By dominating Lebanon, the Syrian president could stifle the investigation, which relies heavily on Lebanese judicial cooperation.
More generally, Assad would exploit any Western opening to seize power in Lebanon through his Lebanese allies, against the majority that forced a Syrian withdrawal last year. If this were to succeed, who would be the Praetorian Guard of that new order? Hezbollah. The party could, thus, preserve its autonomy, eliminate its domestic adversaries, and thrive under Syria’s sympathetic eye. This factor alone explains why Syria would never accept to diminish Hezbollah’s power. As Syria plots a return to Lebanon, it has no intention of harming its main ally in that venture.
Young’s prediction has come true.
So the EU, the Saudis, and the United States have all, in different ways and varying degrees of enthusiasm, strengthened Assad’s hand and he has happliy taken advantage.
But what’s most important to remember is that by strengthening Syria, and Hezbollah, the world is also strengthening Iran. Shimon Shapira writes:
The Lebanese flag, which was brutally trampled by Hizbullah during the 1980s, now occupies a place of honor alongside the yellow banner of Hizbullah. The impression is that Hizbullah has adopted the Lebanese state and in its self-appraisal has become an authentic representative of Lebanese national identity. There is a perpetual gap between the pragmatic spirit coming from the Hizbullah political manifesto and Lebanon’s political reality. Hizbullah’s vigorous position insisting that it retain an army of its own that does not heed the authority of the state but rather the representative of Iran’s leader in Lebanon makes a mockery of the clauses in the political manifesto about Lebanon being the eternal homeland. Furthermore, by building a state-like system parallel to that of the Lebanese state, and one that relies on aid and funding from Iran and Syria, Hizbullah does not contribute to the strengthening and health of the Lebanese homeland that Nasrallah says he wants to preserve and nurture. Finally, the subversive conduct of Hizbullah, which acts against the interests of the Lebanese state and sends forth subversive and violent elements into nearby countries such as Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan, makes the concept of loyalty to the Lebanese homeland void of any content.
It would seem, therefore, that the decision of the Lebanese government headed by Saad Hariri to recognize the continued legitimate existence of Hizbullah’s armed militia demonstrates less a case that Hizbullah underwent a process of “Lebanonization,” but rather that the Lebanese state has undergone a process of “Hizbullazation.” Parallel to adopting the Lebanese identity, Hizbullah preserves its essential link to Iran: its commitment to the Iranian leader as the source of authority surpasses any other commitment including on the political level. Hizbullah adopts decisions on war and peace taken by Iran, the sole recognized source of authority, and not only on theoretical and religious issues, as Nasrallah may wish to claim.
Hizbullah’s alleged move toward pragmatism is based to a large extent on an Iranian decision to create a new atmosphere in Lebanon that will allow it to work unmolested. After the Second Lebanon War that erupted at Israel’s initiative and caught Hizbullah by surprise, Iran ordered Hizbullah to restrain activities against Israel and intensify its integration into the political life of the Lebanese state. Iran is looking for strict silence in the Lebanese arena in order to enable Hizbullah to reconstruct its strategic capabilities (including long-range rockets and missiles) in Lebanon in order to deter Israel, and to make use of these capabilities at a time to be determined by Tehran in the event that deterrence fails. This is the main reason for the quiet prevailing in South Lebanon, and it seems that Israeli deterrence of Hizbullah plays only a minor role.
The meeting between Hariri and Assad doesn’t just mark a new high point in the Syrian domination of Lebanon. It also represents the transformation of Lebanon into Iran’s cat’s paw. That which appeases Iran only makes it stronger.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
