The miller’s (fractured fairy) tale

In a much commented on article,
The False Religion of Mideast Peace: And Why I’m No Longer a Believer by Aaron David Miller in Foreign Policy , Miller writes:

“I remember attending Rabin’s funeral in 1995 in Jerusalem and trying to convince myself that America must and could save the peace process that had been so badly undermined by his assassination. I’m not a declinist. I still believe in the power of American diplomacy when it’s tough, smart, and fair. But the enthusiasm, fervor, and passion have given way to a much more sober view of what’s possible. Failure can do that.”

While I certainly agree with Miller’s title, I find the particulars of his article unconvincing. Was the “peace process” really undermined by the assassination of Yitzchak Rabin?

During the subsequent weeks, Shimon Peres, who succeeded Rabin withdrew Israel troops from Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqiliya, Ramallah, and Bethlehem. Given the popularity that Peres gained by a reaction against Netanyahu in the wake of Rabin’s assassination, he likely would have been re-elected Prime Minister in 1996 when elections were due to take place. Right before Rabin was assassinated, Netanyahu had finally started leading Rabin in polls.

But in February and March of 1996 a series of terror attacks killed over 60 Israelis and hurt Peres’s popularity. While the bombings were attributed to revenge for Yihye Ayyash (recently honored by the PA), they likely were the result of new opportunities. Arafat, given control over six more cities, preferred to allow Hamas to operate unmolested – instead of fulfilling his obligation by securing the territory he had been given -giving Hamas the opportunity to attack.

Miler, of course, can claim that Rabin’s assassination hurt the peace process, but the sequence of subsequent events shows otherwise. Without the suicide bombings in early 1996, Peres would likely have been elected Prime Minister in 1996 and the peace process would have continued apace.

Now, of course, that assumes that Arafat was a trustworthy “partner for peace.” And I would argue that Peres in 1996 wasn’t as “left wing” as Netanyahu is now. The peace process has persisted since then. Israel has withdrawn from Gaza. Lately Netanyahu has removed more checkpoints. But the Palestinians still refuse to accept the basic premises of coexistence with Israel.

Before I finish, let’s look at one more article Miller, wrote, Israel’s Lawyer. This was written in 2005 when Miller was no longer working for the government. So of course, no one was doing anything right. (Never mind that Israel would soon withdraw from Gaza. One would assume that Miller would consider that as furthering the “peace process.”)

In fact, the Arabs may well understand something we have forgotten. When we have used our diplomacy wisely and functioned as advocates and lawyers for both sides, we have succeeded. In the history of U.S. peacemaking, only three Americans have managed to play this role effectively. Two secretaries of state, Henry Kissinger and James Baker, gained Israel’s trust but met Arab needs as well in brokering the disengagement agreements of the 1970s and the Madrid conference in 1991. President Jimmy Carter employed the same two-client approach in mediating the 1978 Camp David accords and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Miller may forget but the Camp David Accords worked mostly because Sadat decided to come to Israel and show interest in peace. He did so, in part, as a result of a huge foreign policy bungle by Carter – who invited the Russians to be involved in the Middle East after Sadat had expelled the Russians from Egypt. I don’t know that it was the American role or the desire of the two parties.

And, of course, his loving memory of his former boss, James Baker is somewhat skewed. Baker earned “Israel’s trust?” Please. Here’s how Baker described the peace process.

There was evidence from the beginning that this U.S. administration was going to push Israel hard. Back in February 1989, in his first interview as Secretary of State, James Baker explained to Time magazine that diplomacy was like a turkey hunt. Paraphrasing: “You have got to fatten up the turkeys. I have this assistant who puts out the feed, he fattens up the turkeys, you get them good and fat, and then you shoot them.” When asked what country he had in mind, he answered “Israel!”

Aside from the fact that I’m not exactly sure what the Madrid conference accomplished – other than getting Israel and its enemies to sit down, I hardly think that Baker achieved even that modest success by gaining Israel’s trust.

Lacking in Miller’s analysis is any real humility. He doesn’t acknowledge that he based his peace processing on trusting Arafat and that was a fundamental reason for his failure.

I can agree with Miller’s conclusion, but the particulars leave me unconvinced that he has understood the mistakes he’s made over his career as a peace processor.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.