I mean 4.
Today in Many possible Israeli concessions would be suicidal George Will writes:
Twenty-one Israeli settlements were dismantled; even the bodies of Israelis buried in Gaza were removed. After a deeply flawed 2006 election encouraged by the United States, there was in 2007 essentially a coup in Gaza by the terrorist organization Hamas. So now Israel has on its western border, 44 miles from Tel Aviv, an entity dedicated to Israel’s destruction, collaborative with Iran and possessing a huge arsenal of rockets.
Rocket attacks from Gaza increased dramatically after Israel withdrew. The number of U.N. resolutions deploring this? Zero.
The closest precedent for that bombardment was the Nazi rocket attacks on London, which were answered by the destruction of Hamburg, Dresden and other German cities. When Israel struck back at Hamas, the “international community” was theatrically appalled.
Of course there’s much more in the op-ed.
Richard Kemp also makes a return appearance. He makes similar arguments to those employed by Will, even if his primary example is different. Here’s what he writes (and says) in Will an IDF Withdrawal from the West Bank Mean a Safe Haven for Extremist Groups?
To stand any real chance of success, every insurgent or terrorist movement needs a safe haven to operate from – one that is outside the control of the state being targeted and preferably in a land that is free from interference by the target state or its allies, whether due to geography, the protection of a friendly regime, or operating within a failed state. The Vietnam conflict was a classic example of the use of a safe haven. More recently, in the Iraq campaign, Sunni extremists had a safe haven in Syria which was their main logistic support base and a pipeline for suicide bombers flowing into Iraq. They also used extensive support networks in Iran, which also provided a safe haven for Shi’ite insurgents attacking coalition forces, as well as through the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hizbullah, which provided training, organization, munitions, and direction.
Today the Afghan Taliban’s safe haven and support base is in Pakistan, although the second largest extremist group engaged in Afghanistan, Hizb-i-Islami, has its main base in Iran itself. In March, General Petraeus, the Head of U.S. Central Command, in testimony to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, revealed that Tehran is letting al-Qaeda leaders travel freely between Pakistan and Afghanistan, effectively using Iranian territory as a safe haven, while permitting them also to hold meetings in Iran to plan terrorist attacks against U.S. and other Western targets.
Israel has had more than a flavor of what it can mean to leave hostile groups in control of lands adjacent to its own borders in southern Lebanon and in Gaza. Any similar move to totally cede control to the Palestinians of the West Bank or a part of Jerusalem may have considerable attraction for any peace process, and that is certainly the view of many in the international community. But both prospects would carry immense risk from the perspective of asymmetrical activities against Israel.
Barry Rubin, in a comprehensive critique of George Mitchell’s (and, apparently, the administration’s) misconceptions, Competing World Views Tear A “Peace Process” to Pieces, similary observes:
Again, Mitchell says what he needs to say, but of course he omits the Hamas violent coup against the PA. Indeed, his statement jibes with the false history of Hamas and its supporters and is rather a mess factually. Abbas’s turn came to an end almost two years ago and Hamas could easily argue—and it sure will do so–that he is in office illegally and thus that any agreement he reached with Israel was not valid. By the way, Mitchell states that Hamas does “acknowledge the continued executive authority of President Abbas and his team.†I believe that this is false.
In short, Mitchell lays the basis in theory for an Israel-Palestinian treaty leading to a Palestinian state, then Hamas overthrowing the regime to seize control of that state, tossing out the treaty and calling in Iranian and Syrian troops to “protect†Palestine. True, this is leaping ahead in time but this is the kind of thing negotiators need to take into account.
In different ways, Will, Col. Kemp and Prof. Rubin all raise the specter of an eventual terrorist takeover of any territory that Israel cedes. Finally we have a Washington Post editorial, What Israelis and Palestinians must concede if they want a lasting peace:
But the welcoming of good news shouldn’t morph into naive celebration. Ms. Clinton was amply justified in warning of obstacles ahead.
The most obvious of those, as she said, will come from the unambiguous “enemies of peace.” Hamas, which controls a good chunk of what would become a Palestinian state, might well respond to progress in the talks with increased attempts at violence, and terrorism from other quarters is also likely. Israeli settlers and their supporters who oppose not peace but any ceding of territory may engineer provocations of their own.
There are also potential obstacles within the talks. Is Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu truly committed to a two-state solution? Many Arabs have their doubts. It will be important for him not to allow next month’s scheduled end of a settlement moratorium to abort the negotiations.
Is Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas truly willing to accept, once and for all, Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state? Given his inability to say yes to past reasonable offers, many Israelis have their doubts. It will be important for him to engage substantively and not wait for the United States to impose terms. And even if both leaders are willing to compromise, are they also capable of bringing their polities along?
It’s frustrating that even after PM Netanyahu withdrew Israel from Hevron, “sophisticates” are still questioning his commitment to a “two state solution.” The editorial rightly points out the danger that Hamas poses for peace but doesn’t acknowledge that Hamas would still be a threat to Israel even after any hypothetical peace agreement was agreed upon and implemented. And “settlers” as the Post calls them haven’t managed to scuttle Oslo or the withdrawal from Gaza, so that reference is gratuitous and unfair.
Still at the end, the Post acknowledges:
Israelis once again will be asked to cede control over territory for intangible and reversible promises of peace and recognition. No one should underestimate the risks of that, especially given the unwillingness of Arab states to offer to Israel even the minor concessions of goodwill that Mr. Obama asked for.
Limiting that concern to two sentences though, fails to acknowledge the unfortunate history of previous Israeli withdrawals (1995, 2000, 2005) all of which led to strengthening terrorists and subsequent terror wars against Israel is disappointing. This is a significant risk, and the Post ought to be giving it more attention than an afterthought.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
It’s nice to know there are at least some sane people out there who won’t drink the MSM Kool-aid “gee we could solve this in a jiffy if Israel just weren’t so mean to the poor Palestinians”.
So the Post agrees that Israel is asked to make real, substantial, and risky concessions in return for which it will get at best words, and it understands that the Arabs are unwilling to offer even meager and generally meaningless words.
Still, anyone want to bet that future Post editorials will call for Israel to take “risks for peace?”