OpFor says says that the current Israeli air campaign is prepping the battlefield for a ground war.
One of the lessons America, and the world, drew from the lightning campaigns of Gulf Wars I & II was the importance of battlesplace preparation. That is, the conditioning of the battlefield’s environment prior to initiating full scale military operations.
What we are witnessing in southern Lebanon is concurrent with actions designed to prep a battlefield for the insertion of ground forces. So far, Israel has relied on its dominance in sea and air forces to isolate Hezbollah, rather than focusing their brunt of their superior forces on actual enemy positions. By blockading the coast, neutralizing Beruit’s airport, and damaging roads and bridges into and out of Lebanon, the IDF has cut off Hezbollah’s supply routes by land, sea, and air, and blocked all lines of escape.
These isolation actions are eerily similiar to Coalition movements prior to Operation Hail Mary during the first Gulf War, where allied aircraft severed supply lines to foward deployed Iraqi Army units.
So does Stratfor:
Hezbollah’s strategy has been imposed on it. It seems committed to standing and fighting. The rate of fire they are maintaining into Israel is clearly based on an expectation that Israel will be attacking. The rocketry guarantees the Israelis will attack. Hezbollah has been reported to have anti-tank and anti-air weapons. The Israelis will use airmobile tactics to surround and isolate Hezbollah concentrations, but in the end, they will have to go in, engage and defeat Hezbollah tactically. Hezbollah obviously knows this, but there is no sign of disintegration on its part. At the very least, Hezbollah is projecting an appetite for combat. Sources in Beirut, who have been reliable to this point, say Hezbollah has weapons that have not yet been seen, such as anti-aircraft missiles, and that these will be used shortly.
And so does DefeneseTech.
I am not a battle analyst, nor do I play one on TV. But it makes no sense to me that Israel would withdraw before dealing Hezbullah a death-blow.
In closing, an in-depth analysis of Hezbullah, Iran, and Syria’s involvement, in the International Herald Tribune—originally published in parent company New York Times corp. How is it they can get it so right in this article, and still write those wretched editorials decrying “disproportionate” force?
The use of the longer-range rockets has led many regional experts to conclude that Iran gave at least tacit approval for the current clash – and it was not just a few rogue Revolutionary Guard advisers in southern Lebanon who decided to let rip with more powerful weapons.
“Would Hezbollah use a sophisticated missile that can hit Haifa without permission from Iran?” said Prof. Abbas Milani, chairman of Iranian studies at Stanford University. “I doubt it.”
Read the rest.
It’s obviously battlefield prep, sure. Smart money is on an incursion into Lebanon, a small buffer zone (maybe as much as 20 kilometers), clearing out Hizbullah while negotiating some way for Lebanese forces to come in and take responsibility for their own damn country.
I’m hoping that the smart money is wrong, and that they’re prepping the battlefield for a move on Damascus. An attack on Syria doesn’t have to go all the way to Damascus — or occupy it — to call Iran’s bluff, and show that Iran can’t protect their ally; but Baby Assad either has to be scared, or killed. Or scared then killed.
The mistake would be to think that the Israelis are improvising strategically; the only worse mistake would be if the Israelis were improvising strategically.
I don’t think that they are. I think that they may be making a mistake in taking too small a bite, but I think there’s every reason to believe that this isn’t an improvisation. If the point is to use appropriate force to persuade the Lebanese that they’ve got a choice of facing Hizbollah or the IDF, that’s only going to work if Plan B involves a lot more destruction of Lebanon when (not, alas, if) the Lebanese don’t get the point.
And maybe they should’t; maybe the non-Hezbollards in Lebanon are right to be more scared of the Shiite-heads. Hezbollah isn’t going to tell other factions “hey, we’re about to bomb you right about here; time to move out.” Israel, for good or ill, does.
I’m hoping that the short-term goal is Hizbollah in south Lebanon and Syria in about 2-3 days.
Most of the analysis I’ve read doesn’t seem to be able to comprehend tis lasting more than a week. (A news cycle?) This analysis makes more sense, and gives me more hope than just about anything else I’ve seen.)