Griffe Witte reports in the Washington Post, As Israeli Siege Strangles Gaza Strip, Hamas, Smugglers Profit Off Tunnels.Despite the title, and some silliness in the beginning the article is, overall, rather informative. For all the talk of the “strangling” of Gaza, Elder of Ziyon has pointed out that Israel allows plenty of basic goods to pass through its borders with Gaza.
Early on Witte shows focuses on the smugglers who make their living by providing contraband for the population in Gaza. Then he explains Israel’s rationale in imposing the blockade.
But Israel also seems reluctant to try to stop the smuggling altogether because it would increase the pressure to allow more supplies through the official crossings.
“The best thing from our point of view is that there would be no smuggling of ammunition. We don’t care about the other things,” said Shlomo Dror, spokesman for Israel’s Defense Ministry.
Israel’s hope in imposing the siege was to employ economic pressure to weaken Hamas, forcing Gazans to turn against the group as their suffering made them long for better days under the rival Fatah party.
Dror’s comment is worrisome because Israel has no control over the tunnels. Allowing contraband to pass through the tunnels means that weapons and munitions can be smuggled and Israel can only rely on the good faith of Hamas to prevent that. Witte’s also wrong in his description of Israel’s “hope” in blockading Gaza.
Another reason was to stop the flow of materiel to Gaza. This is a reason that Witte dismisses as an “Israeli claim,” but it is a significant reason.
Then he quotes an Israeli who argues against the blockade:
“If you want to strengthen radicals and paralyze moderates, I can’t think of a better way to do it than by closing Gaza’s commercial crossings and depriving 1.5 million people of the right to earn a decent and legitimate living,” said Sari Bashi, executive director of the Israel-based human rights group Gisha.
It’s a nice soundbite, but much of the rest of Witte’s article shows that the siege has been effective in isolating Hamas and even reducing its popularity.
Israel’s hope in imposing the siege was to employ economic pressure to weaken Hamas, forcing Gazans to turn against the group as their suffering made them long for better days under the rival Fatah party.
There are indications that the strategy is working — to a point. In 2006, Hamas won legislative elections in a landslide. But a poll released this month found that Hamas’s popularity in Gaza had recently plummeted, with only 39 percent favoring the group’s leader, Ismail Haniyeh, compared with 56 percent for Fatah boss Mahmoud Abbas.
But if Hamas’s popularity is declining, its power seems to grow.
That last sentence is belied by the rest of the reporting. Hamas’s popularity is declining. It’s just making money in a new way now. The behavior of Hamas is awfully reminiscent of the corruption of Fatah. Not only is it taxing the smugglers excessively, it’s also raiding charities. That’s less a sign growing power than it is of desperation.
Meryl summarizes the costs of the last year of Hamas’s rule on Israel.
Elder of Ziyon shows that the last ceasefire with Hamas was little more than unilateral disarmament by Israel.
Israel Matzav has a video of Hamas’s preparations for the ceasefire.
Of course that means that the editors of the Washington Post think the ceasefire is a good thing, In they write:
ATRUCE between Israel and Hamas was to begin this morning in the Gaza Strip, ending daily barrages of rockets that have terrorized nearby Israeli towns as well as counterstrikes that have killed more than 350 Palestinians this year. In accepting the Egyptian-brokered deal, Israel embraced the least bad of the limited options it has for countering Hamas, which has been turning Gaza into a fortified base for advancing the cause of Islamist extremism in the region — a cause it shares with Iran. For a while, Israeli civilians will be relieved from having to duck into bomb shelters, and Gazans will be better supplied with food and other essential goods. How long the peace lasts, and whether it does more good than harm, will depend on how well Israel and Hamas‘s moderate Palestinian rivals use the calm.
The “least bad option”? There’s a premise to this editorial that Hamas cannot be defeated. Of course it can. The problem would the cost of that defeat. But failing to keep Hamas on the defensive, will only increase the cost to Israel when war actually breaks out. (The Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon was a direct – though not immediate – cause of the Israel/Hezbollah war of 2006.) The concluding question of the paragraph shows that the editors of the Post aren’t even certain that the truce is likely to work out.
The editorial concludes:
At best, Mr. Olmert and Mr. Abbas would now press to complete a peace deal, so that the Palestinian president would have a tangible and attractive alternative to offer to Hamas’s promise of endless “resistance” to the Jewish state. Some hope that an accord between the two Palestinian factions could give Mr. Abbas leeway to close the deal for statehood. Yet Mr. Olmert, who has been badly weakened by scandals, appears more interested in brokering a prisoner exchange with Hezbollah and in conducting long-shot peace talks with Lebanon and Syria than in making tough decisions about matters such as the future of Jerusalem. Both Israel and its Iranian-backed enemies are maneuvering for tactical advantage, trying to bolster their positions as they await a new U.S. president. They have not averted the major conflict that has threatened the region for the last couple of years — only postponed it.
What exactly negotiations will accomplish is beyond me. But this isn’t just about relations between Israel and the Palestinians, it’s about Iran and its influence as the final sentence suggests. Israel’s ceasefire with Hamas is less about maneuvering for position than it is about giving Iran’s proxy a huge victory.
Michael Oren argues precisely that inIsrael’s Truce With Hamas Is a Victory for Iran:
Proponents of an Israeli-Palestinian accord are praising the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas that went into effect this morning. Yet even if the agreement suspends violence temporarily — though dozens of Hamas rockets struck Israel yesterday — it represents a historic accomplishment for the jihadist forces most opposed to peace, and defeat for the Palestinians who might still have been Israel’s partners.
Oren writes that Israel by refusing the military’s recommendation to fight Hamas, has handed Hamas a victory. The ceasefire thus gives Hamas added credibility.
Tellingly, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who once declared Hamas illegal, will soon travel to Gaza for reconciliation talks. Mr. Abbas’s move signifies the degree to which Hamas, with Israel’s help, now dominates Palestinian politics. It testifies, moreover, to another Iranian triumph.
As the primary sponsor of Hamas, Iran is the cease-fire’s ultimate beneficiary. Having already surrounded Israel on three of its borders — Gaza, Lebanon, Syria — Iran is poised to penetrate the West Bank. By activating these fronts, Tehran can divert attention from its nuclear program and block any diplomatic effort.
These are obviously bad results and leads Oren to conclude:
The advocates of peace between Israelis and Palestinians should recognize that fact when applauding quiet at any price. The cost of this truce may well be war.
The naivete of those promoting this deal is astounding.
UPDATE: JoshuaPundit finds a silver lining:
A war with Hamas is just over the horizon, as sure as the sun rises. Costly as the delay will be, it would clearly be better for Israel to go to war with very different leadership than it has now.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
