In Parsing Gains of the Gaza War, Ethan Bronner writes:
Halima Dardouna, 37, from the northern city of Jabaliya, whose house was destroyed by an Israeli shell, said both Fatah and Hamas were to blame because of their rivalry, “and we are the victims.”
She added, “I will never vote for Hamas. They are not able to protect the people, and if they are going to bring this on us, why should they be in power? If I thought they could liberate Jerusalem, I would be patient. But instead they bring this.”
I don’t know how prevalent this view is, but clearly Israel showed that Hamas could not protect the residents of Gaza. Hezbollah faced the same problem two and a half years ago. And yet Robert Worth reports in Why the Arabs splinter over Gaza.
Yet the 2006 war strengthened Hezbollah politically, and the group now seems likely to win a majority in the parliamentary elections later this year, a pivotal development. Many people in Lebanon fear that the current war could bring similar new strength to Hamas, even as it inflicts political damage on its foes in the Arab world.
“It may take some time, but Hamas will take over the West Bank,” said Sarkis Naoum, a political columnist for the Beirut newspaper Al Nahar.
That, Mr. Naoum added, would put Hamas’s patrons, Syria and Iran, in a much stronger position vis-Ã -vis the other Arab countries. It may also — not coincidentally — put Syria and Iran in a stronger position vis-Ã -vis the United States, should Barack Obama follow through on his proposal to talk directly with them.
Shimon Shapira explains how Hezbollah regained its stature.
There are important precedents to keep in mind concerning the link between rehabilitation and regional political influence. Following the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Iran and Hizbullah grasped the political and economic significance of the rehabilitation project in the Shiite areas of southern Lebanon damaged during the war. Iran, in tandem with Hizbullah, quickly resorted to the Waad (promise) company and employed it to channel most of the Iranian assistance funds into the rehabilitation activities that Hizbullah performed in West Beirut and southern Lebanon.2 In this framework, immediately upon the cessation of fighting, Iran’s emissaries appeared with suitcases stuffed with dollars and distributed $12,000 in cash to every Shiite family whose house was destroyed and applied for assistance.
Within a few short months, Iran had paved hundreds of kilometers of roads and rehabilitated houses and public institutions that were damaged during the fighting. Hizbullah directed the rehabilitation work among the Shiite population, while totally ignoring the central Lebanese government, and in this manner it regained and even reinforced its influence within the Shiite community. Hizbullah was savvy enough to transform the severe blows that it had sustained into a “divine victory” and into the principal leverage for buttressing its dominant status in Lebanese politics. It did so while rehabilitating its military strength and tripling the quantity of rockets and missiles at its disposal, while extending their target range.
Shapira writes that it is essential for Hamas to be prevented from playing a similar role in Gaza. Ineffective though it may be, he recommends that Fatah be put in charge of the rebuilding of Gaza to deny Hamas the opportunity to play the benefactor’s role. One of the under-emphasized aspects of Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s buildups has been that they are Iran’s proxies. So when they get strengthened, so does Iran.
In a replay of Nasrallah’s taped declaration of victory two and a half years ago, Ismail Haniyeh is now declaring victory. Worse Hamas is setting terms: claiming that the price for the return of Gilad Shalit has gone up.
Also on Monday, Mushir al-Masri, another spokesman for Hamas in the Strip, said that the terror group would not lower its demands in return for captive IDF soldier Gilad Schalit following the three-week war with Israel, and may even increase its demands.
“We are in a powerful, victorious position,” he told Israel Radio, “Israel will soon learn that the balance of power has changed in Hamas’s favor.”
Israel is allowing Hamas to declare victory. Why?
For example the NYT reports:
Still, the actual damage to Hamas appears to have been limited partly because it acted so cautiously. There is irony in this, that Israel, the state with the well-trained army, wildly pressed the attack, while Hamas, the Islamist militia that supposedly embraces death, shied from the fight.
The group was by all accounts able to preserve a substantial portion of its force. Hundreds of Hamas fighters were reported killed, but general estimates put the entire force well into the thousands. Israeli military officials said they saw very few fighters on the battlefield. They came out mostly in ones and twos and only a few attempted suicide bombings.
But was Hamas careful or scared? Sure Hamas has thousands of fighters, but Israel killed at least two of its leaders. And signing up for Hamas is different from being an effective combatant.
But Strategy Page paints a much different picture.
As a result, most of the claimed 20,000 Hamas gunmen have deserted their units, leaving only some of the officers (5-10 percent of each unit) to carry on. By the second week of January, Israeli troops were mainly encountering Hamas officers in combat. Hamas had made elaborate plans to hit the Israelis with snipers, ambushes, remotely controlled bombs and booby traps in houses. But there were few Hamas fighters around to do all this, and the plans fell apart.
Even a special unit of about a hundred fighters, that had received combat training in Iran, was quickly wiped out when they fought the Israelis. This was very embarrassing for Iran, which had promised to turn the 20,000 Hamas gunmen into a crack fighting force. Back in Iran, this failure was blamed on the Arabs, who Iranians generally despise as lazy and stupid. Hamas doesn’t know who to blame, although many Palestinians believe Hamas had deceived itself, and disappointed all Palestinians, and the Arab world as well.
So this suggests that rather than being cautious out of tactical considerations, as the Times suggests, Hamas was cautious out of fear. Furthermore it suggests that those who engaged in combat with Israel, were the best fighters and they were not much of a challenge. So Israel inflicted a significant toll on those terrorists who were the biggest threat.
These are points that Israel must emphasize. Israel ought to be issuing statements challenging Haniyeh and Zahar to declare victory at a specific public location and a specific time. Goad him. Show that he talks a good game, but is a coward. Publicize the names of those killed so that the population of Gaza knows that the people who were supposed to protect them, couldn’t.
And as noted above, give Hamas no opportunity to claim credit for reconstruction. Though Israel apparently stopped fighting in deference to the incoming administration (via memeorandum), maybe the acting Treasury Secretary will be serious about preventing Hamas from getting a hold of reconstruction funding. And Israel must not allow Hamas to snatch the narrative of victory from the jaws of defeat.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
Of course, a HUGE amount of the credit — and at tmes I seem to be the only one saying it — for the shocking restoration of Hezbollah following the Lebanon War of the Summer 2006 goes to …. drum roll, please: Ms Condoleeza Rice, who not only palpably pressured Israel into prematurely curtailing her efforts in Lebanon, but also fairly PIMPED for the farcical UN-monitored cease-fire that “ended” that War. Does no one recall Ms Rice’s bold-faced assertions that she was confident that said cease-fire would be a “robust” arrangement in which the UN would work to prevent Hezbollah from rearming under the nose of the central Lebanese government. http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/August/20060816122957eaifas0.1131403.html
Whether the woman is simply an incompetent naive or a truly cunning, Islamist-sympathizing anti-Semite, only the L-RD knows, but now that the dust has settled — some two-and-a-half years hence — with Lebanon’s throat firmly within Nasrallah’s steel grasp, what difference does it make? In fact, I believe history will show this to be one of the terrific failures of the Second President GW Bush Administration. (I suspect that even President Bush — in a candid, private moment — would admit as much.)